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ENGLISH SPIRITUAL WRITERS

VII. WALTER HILTON

WALTER HILTON died in 1395 as an Augustinian Canon of Thurgarton in Nottinghamshire, but there is reason to suppose that it was only comparatively late in life that he joined this community, and almost nothing is known with certainty about his earlier life. Three works can confidently be attributed to him and several others with great probability, but in this article I propose to confine myself to his spirituality as put forth in his chief work, *The Scale of Perfection*.

There is a certain difficulty for us in approaching the *Scale*, because it was written for an anchoress, a person therefore in a very special way of life, which is far removed from the experience of most people today. But the form which the *Scale* took was dictated not only by the fact that Hilton was writing for someone who was in effect a hermit, but also by the fact that he was writing within a very definite tradition, which had come to the West, principally through the writings of the pseudo-Denis, direct from the Alexandrian writers of the fourth and fifth centuries. The spirituality which these writers represented was primarily that of the early Egyptian monks, but there is no doubt that the intellectual background which they provided for this was coloured by Greek philosophical ideas, and particularly that of contemplation as the end of life. It was a very specialized spirituality with an emphasis on contemplation quite unfamiliar to us.

It would be possible to approach a work of this nature in many ways, but I should like in this article to point out that, in spite of what might be considered its specialized nature, Hilton's treatise is very valuable and full of practical advice for those who are trying to lead a serious spiritual life but would by no means call themselves contemplatives. Its great merit is that it treats the contemplative life as a natural and continuous development of the life of grace begun at baptism, and not as

something esoteric only to be embarked upon self-consciously by the few. His main concern is with contemplation, but Hilton lays his foundations deep, and the *Scale* is in fact a comprehensive treatise on the spiritual life. The foundation on which all has to be built is what he calls the reforming,¹ the re-establishment, of the image of God in us. He treats of this in both of the books into which the *Scale* is divided, in Chapters 42 to 45 of the first, and in Chapters 1 to 20 of the second. When he says that man was made in the image of God, the point that he stresses is not the fundamental likeness to the Trinity in the powers of the soul, but that before the Fall the three powers of man's soul, memory, understanding, and will, were all directed to and occupied with God; in so far as its powers were directed primarily to God the soul could be said to reflect His nature. That this was the sense in which Hilton thought of it as an image of God is brought out by the fact that he goes on to say that as a result of Adam's sin man fell from this state "into forgetfulness and ignorance of God, and into a monstrous love of himself" (p. 64). From this condition he was rescued by Christ, and in the second Book (Chapter 2) he sets out the reasons for the Redemption following more or less closely St Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*. As a result of the Passion and Death of Christ the image of God, in the sense in which he has used the term, may be restored to man, fully only in heaven, but partially here on earth, and into this partial restoration he introduces a further distinction. It may be in faith only, or in faith and feeling. The meaning of this rather curious distinction is this: the soul that is restored in faith only is simply in a state of grace. The soul that is restored in faith and feeling is also in a state of grace, but this further restoration "by the power of the Holy Ghost makes the soul aware of the workings of grace in it" (p. 154). The soul has attained a degree of grace in which "it apprehends God and spiritual truths in the higher parts of its reason" (p. 175), and this is the contemplative state.

It is characteristic of Hilton's wide view of the spiritual life that writing to instruct an anchoress in the ways of contempla-

¹ I have thought it better to keep this word as a sort of technical term, as I did in my rendering of the *Scale* into modern English in the Orchard Series. References in this article are to that edition. Burns & Oates, 1953.

tion he nevertheless devotes a number of chapters to those who by the terms of his own definition have not yet attained that state.¹ He begins at the beginning, describing the effects of baptism and the sacrament of Penance. He held, incidentally, an unorthodox view on the latter sacrament, holding that the sin was forgiven by contrition and that the priest's absolution was only declarative. A view put forward by Peter Lombard and held by St Bonaventure and many of the Franciscan school, but later condemned by Trent. He does not underrate this state, "The majority of God's elect lead their lives in this state, reformed only in faith" (p. 163). They strive seriously against sin, "and if they live their lives in this state and are found in it at the hour of their death, they will be saved and will be fully reformed in the happiness of heaven, even though they may never have felt any spiritual consolation or received any special grace of devotion all their lives" (p. 163). He gives practical advice for the struggle against temptation (Chapter 11), and emphasizing his distinction about "feeling" or the absence of it he points out that a man may be in this state without in any way being able to recognize the fact.

He may indeed, if he has the grace and watches over himself, feel sorrow for his sin, and that his will has turned away from it. But he does not see or experience in any way the reforming of his soul, how it is in a wonderful, but imperceptible, way changed from the hideousness of a devil to the beauty of an angel, through the mysterious power of God. He cannot see that, but he must believe it (p. 160).

He goes on to say that a man may easily fall from this state, and must strive constantly against what he calls the image of sin that is within him.

But it is with the attainment of reform in feeling that he is ultimately concerned, and it is important to realize that when he uses the word feeling he does not imply any sort of emotional, still less a sensible, experience. What he means by it in fact, as will appear abundantly later, is an inward awareness of the life of grace, which at any recognizable level is a definitely

¹ The greater part of Chapters 1 to 20 of the second Book is devoted to this,

mystical experience, the experience of contemplation. In Chapters 1 to 13 of the first Book he gives a summary conspectus of the stages of the contemplative life, and in Chapters 10 to 13 he warns at length against attaching importance to any sort of sensible phenomena. They may, he says, be good or evil in origin, and he gives the sound traditional advice that it is by their fruits they are to be known. The attainment of this reform in feeling, he is careful to point out, must be a gradual process.

Reform in faith is the lowest state of elect souls, below which they cannot well be, and reform in feeling is the highest state that a soul can come to in this life. But a soul cannot suddenly jump from the lowest to the highest, any more than a man who will climb a high ladder and puts his foot on the lowest rung can at the next moment be on the top one. He must go up them in order till he comes to the highest. So it is spiritually (p. 183).

This ladder is the *Scale*, which gives its title to the book, though he nowhere else refers to it.

It is perhaps the most valuable feature of Hilton's exposition of spirituality in *The Scale of Perfection* that while he recognizes the ascent of the ladder as necessarily a gradual process, he does not attempt to mark off the steps one from another. Any full analysis, such as that eventually achieved by St Teresa and St John of the Cross, must of necessity set out the course of the soul's development in a series of stages, and the fact that those two saints did so detracts nothing from the splendour of their achievement. The human mind can assemble and master the data of a complex experience only by some such method, but the fact remains that spiritual development does not occur in jumps. One step merges into another, and there is fluctuation and eddying, even if a general movement in one direction is discernible. The danger of a too clear definition of states, and particularly of the entry into what is called a contemplative or mystical state in general, is that such a state comes to be regarded as something wholly unusual, the prerogative of very special souls. In its more advanced manifestations it is certainly unusual, and it is true that contemplation properly so-called is beyond the power of man to achieve by himself, but Hilton's merit is that for him, as will appear later, the contemplative

state is only one in which the essential sanctifying grace given at baptism has reached a degree at which its effects may be recognized. And the attainment of this is a gradual process. When the soul first acquires grace in baptism, or reacquires it in the sacrament of Penance, it may not be aware of the fact, but it is already on the road which may lead it to the heights of contemplation. In effect, therefore, anyone who is trying to do something more than just keep out of mortal sin—and even such a one—already has his foot on the first rung of the ladder; and Hilton's two stages of reform in fact merge into each other.

With all this in view we may look more closely at what he has to say about this reform in feeling. What is needed as the foundation on which everything else must be built is desire for Jesus, as he puts it; "desire of God, of Jesus—it is all the same", he says (p. 73).¹ It is very important to understand exactly what he means by this. Remembering his term "reform in faith and feeling" and the meaning which he gives to it, there is no doubt that when he says we are to desire Jesus, he means that we are to desire a realization of His presence which amounts to contemplation. In his early summary, in Chapter 13 of the first Book, he says, "But your constant endeavour shall be through much prayer to attain to the experimental knowledge of God in your soul" (p. 19). He quotes St Paul: *In caritate radicati et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere*, etc. (Eph. iii, 17, 18) and expands it as follows:

Be rooted and grounded in charity, not that you may perceive sounds or a sweet savour or any other sensation, but that you may know and experience with all the saints, what is the extent of the infinite being of God, the breadth of His wonderful charity and goodness, the height of His almighty majesty, and the bottomless depths of His wisdom. It is in the knowledge and experience of these things that the work of a contemplative consists (p. 19).

Many passages could be quoted to illustrate the fact, and indeed it is the explicit aim of the treatise. All that is perfectly

¹ The extent to which the *Scale* is Christ-centric is remarkable. Hilton habitually uses the Holy Name Jesus when one might expect him to say simply God, and once he applies it to God in a passage from the Old Testament (p. 151). He excuses himself for the practice (p. 292). See also Book II, Chapter 30 (p. 235 and note).

natural within the Dionysian tradition. And though it may be true that the idea of making the attainment of contemplation the direct end of our life here on earth owed its origin at least in part to Greek philosophy, there is no doubt that the idea was received and consecrated by the Church. Always in the East, and roughly from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century in the West, it held almost undisputed sway. After the Quietist troubles in the seventeenth century the pursuit of contemplation for the most part ceased to be integrated with the spiritual life—a swing of the pendulum which has perhaps gone too far.

But we can get further light on this idea of contemplation as an awareness of grace. Hilton develops it with some fullness in the second Book. He describes, particularly in Chapters 31 to 33, the increase in the soul's *knowledge* which comes as a result of contemplation, "For then the soul understands something of what it knew before only by faith" (p. 246). In Chapter 34 he says that the soul's happiness lies in this knowledge, and it is the gift of Uncreated Love, that is the Holy Spirit, in the soul which brings this about.

It is Uncreated Love, that is God Himself, who is the cause of all this knowledge. For owing to sin and the weakness of its human nature the poor, blind soul is so far from the clear knowledge of God and the enjoyment of His love that it would never be able to attain them, if it were not for the infinite greatness of God's love. But because He loves us so much, He gives us His love, that is the Holy Ghost. He is both the giver and the gift, and by that gift makes us know and love Him. This is the love that I said you should desire, the uncreated Love that is the Holy Ghost (p. 248).

It is the action of God Himself, then, in the soul, which produces this enlightenment which is contemplation, and he has much to say about the further effects it will produce in the soul, which can easily be identified with the effects we attribute to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. In Chapter 40 he identifies contemplation with various descriptions given by spiritual writers. It is impossible to identify his sources with any certainty for the phrases were all current in the spiritual literature of the

Middle Ages, but among them is the phrase *tasting of the hidden manna*, *Dabo sibi manna absconditum* (Apoc. ii, 17).

This tasting of manna is an awareness of the life of grace which comes from the opening of the soul's eyes. And this grace does not differ from the grace that an elect soul feels at the beginning of its conversion; it is the same grace but experienced in another way, because the progress of the soul and grace are interdependent. The purer and more detached from the love of the world the soul is, the stronger is the grace, the more interior and spiritual the experience of the presence of God. So the same grace that first turns men from sin and makes them set out and advance on the spiritual road by the practice of virtues and good works makes them perfect, and it is called *an awareness of grace*, for he who has it is conscious of the grace within him (pp. 277-8).

He has a further important comment to make on this when he says, that though "the overwhelming consciousness of it [grace] passes, the effect still remains and keeps the soul calm and makes it desire its return" (p. 278). Today we are shy of seeking "the awareness of grace", and yet the fostering of this divine life within us is the whole business of our spiritual lives, and it is for this reason that we can apply so much of what Hilton says about seeking contemplation to the development of the life of grace, in which for us the sacraments will play a larger part than they did for him.

We can find yet another line of thought converging on the same point. In the second Book he describes the soul's progress under the figure of a pilgrimage to Jerusalem (Chapter 21), a pilgrimage which he envisages as being made on foot. One condition is laid down as the guarantee of success in this adventure, and that is determination. The pilgrim will suffer great harm on his journey, he will be robbed and beaten, but he is to keep on his way nevertheless. Surely we are very mistaken if we think of these difficulties as only coming from without. The difficulties that really beset the spiritual life and cause discouragement come from ourselves. They are our temptations and falls into sin, and it is in face of these that we have to keep our goal before us and keep pressing on. It is no new advice,

but it is fundamental. Hilton gives it to his anchoress seeking to attain contemplation, but it is applicable to any stage of a life seriously seeking God. The pilgrim is to encourage himself always by repeating, "I am nothing, I have nothing, I desire only one thing." These words, Hilton says, express what must be his fundamental attitude, namely one of humility and charity. He has rightly stressed the need for these two virtues—the only touchstones of sanctity—before, but his expression of them in this formula is of great significance, for it throws further light on the desire which he talked about in the first Book. "I desire only one thing" the pilgrim is to repeat to himself, and that is to be at Jerusalem, and this Hilton has expressly told us at the beginning of the chapter means to attain reform in feeling, and that, we have seen, means a high degree of grace. Here he explicitly equates this with charity, and the meaning of both words is enhanced by the identification. We must have charity, the love of God, and it is God Himself who gives us this. He is both the giver and the gift, as Hilton has put it.

We may look a little more closely at Hilton's application of his principles. In the first Book, where he is inculcating the need of the soul to reform the image of God in itself, he says that it is to do this by "seeking Jesus". And where is He to be found? "There is no need to go to Rome or to Jerusalem to look for Him, but turn your mind into your own soul, where He is hid, and seek Him there" (p. 79). But the first result of this effort will be disappointing. "What hinders you then that you can neither see nor hear Him? In truth there is so much noise and disturbance in your heart caused by useless thoughts and desires of the flesh that you can neither see Him nor hear Him" (p. 80). That is surely profound spiritual teaching. The first result of turning seriously to God will be an increased awareness of our own sins and imperfections. We shall find, not Jesus whom we seek, "but only the mere remembrance of His name. What more? In truth you will find nothing but an obscure and heavy image of your own soul, which has neither light to know God nor affection to love Him" (p. 83). That is what many who are making a real effort to lead a spiritual life so often feel. They think it is a bad sign, but it is a good one.

It means the real work has at least begun. Hilton calls it finding the image of sin in ourselves, the roots of all the seven deadly sins, and he devotes no less than thirty-eight chapters (Book I, ch. 55-92) to describing these roots of sin and how we are to deal with them. Such is the foundation that he lays for the spiritual life of his contemplative.

He makes use of yet another image to describe the soul's progress, the passage through the night. There are two days or lights, he says, a false one and a true one. "The false light is the love of this world that a man has because of the corruption of his human nature; the true light is the perfect love of Jesus felt in the soul through grace" (p. 204). A man may withdraw himself from the false light of this world, that is from attachment to the things of sense and to his own self-will, but he will not immediately come to the perfect love of God. He cannot come suddenly from one light to the other, any more than he can pass from one day to another without going through the night, and indeed as long as he is on this earth he will never reach the full light of God's day, for that is complete reform in feeling, which is only attained in the Beatific Vision. It is a good image, but it is to be noted that Hilton is using it in a wider sense than that in which it was afterwards used by St John of the Cross. For Hilton the night is the whole spiritual life of a man after he has turned seriously from the love of the world and set his heart on the love of God. Sometimes the night will be distressing, for the world will still exercise an attraction, but gradually the soul will come to rest in it, for the grace of God is drawing it, and from time to time it will see glints and gleams of the true day. Hilton's teaching is admirable on this subject. A man who has embarked on this journey through the night may well find habits of sin, the desires of the flesh, and his worldly activities pressing in on him:

Nevertheless, if you find it so, do not be too depressed, and do not struggle too much, as though you would put these things out of your mind by force, for you cannot do that. Wait till grace comes, be patient and do not let your efforts be too violent: if you can, quietly turn your will and your thoughts to Jesus as though you attached no importance to these feelings (p. 206).

Rightly understood accepting the situation is an important part of the spiritual life. We get impatient, and then we get impatient with ourselves for being impatient. But Hilton's advice presupposes that the desire for God is there, "I desire only one thing," and it is indeed this desire which constitutes the night.

For its [the soul's] desire and its longing for the love of God, for the vision and the possession of Him, drives out of the heart all worldly interests and all desires of the flesh, and makes the soul recollected and occupied only with how it may come to His love, and so it brings it into this fruitful nothing. And all is not darkness and nothing when it is so occupied. . . . For Jesus, who is both love and light, is in the darkness whether it is distressing or peaceful (p. 207).

Doubtless Hilton has in mind his anchoress, who is living a life of itself conducive to great recollection, but the teaching again remains valid for anyone trying seriously to serve God. In the saint the desire is overriding, but in the weakest of us, if it is there at all, it produces its effect.

There is still much in *The Scale of Perfection* that might be commented upon, but only the barest mention of a few points can be made here. In the latter part of the second Book Hilton is, of course, directly concerned with contemplation properly so-called, and his teaching on it is thoroughly in accord with tradition. In Chapters 30 and 33 he gives what is the normal teaching for the necessity of transcending the imagination, but it is to be noted that he does not seem to advocate the adoption of a specific exercise in this, a technique, in the way that the author of the *Cloud* does. He has much to say of the effects this contemplative union with God will produce in the soul. There will be a general ease in the practice of virtue, "Love brings all virtues into the soul and makes them agreeable and pleasant . . . for the soul does not struggle to attain them as it did before, but it possesses them easily and rests in them through this gift of Love" (Book II, ch. 36, p. 258). It is the characteristic effect of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost by which the powers of the soul are made in St Thomas's words *bene mobiles a Spiritu Sancto*. Hilton distinguishes very well between the humility and patience that a virtuous soul may acquire by its own efforts aided by ordinary

grace and those virtues as they will exist in a man who has come to the knowledge of God in contemplation (Book II, ch. 37 and 38). It is worthy of note that only in the last three chapters of his two lengthy Books does he treat of the experiences such as visions, which are often thought of as constituting the essence of the mystical state. There is neither space nor need to discuss these, but it may be noted that in the prominent part given to angels in the production of these phenomena we may perhaps see traces of the Eastern theology that lay behind his work. This is a point, however, which has not been explored.

He wrote before the days of scientific methods of mental prayer. For him the basis of all prayer is vocal prayer as we know it, and he seems to have regarded everything beyond this as at least to some degree inspired or contemplative, but he has a most consoling chapter on distractions at prayer. (See Book I, ch. 24-33).

In matters of food and drink and sleep and bodily penance he advocates a wise discretion. "Moderation is best," he says (p. 35), while in the long section dealing with the roots of sin and how we are to destroy them (Book I, ch. 55-92) he has much valuable advice to give. He stresses that spiritual sins are worse than carnal ones, a view which is theologically correct, though the contrary is often thought, and his chapter (83) on how the anchoress is to behave towards visitors could hardly be bettered as advice on the practical application of the virtue of charity.

The Scale of Perfection is a more closely woven piece of writing than might appear at first sight, a tapestry in which the main design can easily be traced, but in which it is surrounded by much elaborate detail, no part of which is unrelated. To us a few strands may appear alien. It would be surprising if it were not so in a work nearly 600 years old, but they are of very minor importance. What may be more of a difficulty is that, because of the spiritual tradition in which he wrote, Hilton ignores completely, save for a few incidental and perfunctory references, the whole of the Church's liturgy. Many today will find that a serious gap in his teaching, but it is to be remembered that right up till a generation ago it would hardly have been noticed. I have tried to show that a more sacramental

spirituality would fit with ease into his conception of man's relation to God, and of course his wise understanding of a human nature which does not change is valid for all time.

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THE LAST SUPPER

THE sun had set, the first star was lit, and the Paschal meal might now begin.¹ A meal of great solemnity, it was forbidden to merely sit at it as you did at other meals: you must recline.² Jesus and the Twelve, assembled round a low table, were reclining on rugs or mattresses strewn on wooden stands. Their left arms were supported on cushions.

It was unusual for Jesus not to have invited women to the meal. But tonight He had invited only His most intimate followers, because to Jesus, on the last night of His life, they represented His family, they were His destined heirs. And a Jewish meal forged an intimate bond between the participants.

For every one of the Paschal gatherings in Jerusalem that night this meal held a deep significance. They were commemorating Israel's past: and especially that night when God had sealed the bond made by Him between Himself and this nomad tribe. By the first Passover He had marked them out as living under His protection, destined for freedom from their masters, and for a splendid future beyond. But their thoughts were occupied with the future also: with a future saving act of God. "On this night they were saved, and on this night they will be saved" was an old saying of theirs. The Messiah would come to set them free on this night as, once before, on this same night, they had been set free in Egypt. It would be at mid-

¹ For the Paschal character of the Last Supper cf. especially J. Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus*, 2nd ed., Eng. trans. 1955, pp. 1-61; also A. J. B. Higgins, *The Lord's Supper in the New Testament*, 1952, p. 20 sq.; H. Schürmann, *Der Paschamahlbericht*, 1953, pp. 9-11; Higgins, *N.T.S.*, '54-'55, pp. 200-9; C. K. Barrett, *J.T.S.*, 1958, pp. 305-8.

² The rabbinical directives for the Paschal meal can be found in Strack-Billerbeck, Vol. IV; G. Dalman, *Jesus-Jeschua*, 1929; Jeremias, op. cit. Further bibliog. in *T.W.N.T.*, V, p. 895.

night, His arrival, they believed.¹ "The Watcher has said: the morning approaches, but also the night," repeated the Rabbis. And by morning they understood freedom and power for Israel, while night spelt disaster for her enemies. It was a night of tense expectation. On it rebellion against the Roman occupation repeatedly occurred. This longing for a rescuer filled their minds, and found expression, again and again, in the ceremonial of this meal.

After the washing of hands, the wine of the first cup of the feast was mixed with water, and Jesus, acting as head of the family on behalf of all, blessed God for it. He was answered by "Amen"; and then all drank of the cup. Jesus then spoke the blessing for the feast:

We bless You, Jahweh our God, King of the World, who has given to Your people, Israel, this festival of joy and remembrance.

There was now a preliminary dish of lettuce and bitter herbs dipped in a fruit *purée*. It was meant to stimulate the appetite; and the bitterness of the herbs was to remind them of the bitterness of the life their nation had been forced to lead under the foreman's lash, until the liberation they were that night celebrating. But before Jesus dipped His lettuce into the *purée* a look of great sorrow came upon Him. He looked round upon the small circle of His friends.

Believe me, he said, believe me, one of you is to betray me.

It was here that the incident of Judas occurred (John xiii, 21-30).

By this time the meat had been put on the table, a piece set before each. There was the second cup of wine. And now began the part of the evening where the symbolism of the ritual was the most forcibly brought home to each man present: the Haggada and the Hallel.

¹ This belief survived into the Christian era for the Second Coming. St Jerome refers to the apostolic tradition "ut in die vigiliarum Paschae ante noctis dimidium populos dimittere non liceat, expectantes adventum Christi" (M.P.L., 26, 184 sq.).

The first of these began by one of the company asking the president the meaning of the ritual: what distinguished it from other nights? why these special features? In answer the president told the story of the Exodus, based on Deuteronomy xxvi, 5-11, and combined it with the interpretation of the food used at the meal.

Of the Paschal Lamb he would explain how, because of its sacrifice and the sign of its blood, God had spared the families of their forefathers and marked them out for freedom. Then he would lift up in turn the bitter herbs and the unleavened bread telling them how the former represented the bitter life their fathers had led before God set them free, and how the latter stood for the haste in which they had to flee from Egypt under God's protection, no time being left them to leaven the dough. But there was a good deal of latitude given to the individual explanation. Jesus' own interpretation has not come down to us.

Full of thoughts of gratitude now, for this wonderful liberation from the pitiful condition of slavery, and the establishment of their race into an independent nation, the assembly now gave thanks to God for having effected this redemption. First there was a formal invitation to praise:

Therefore it is our duty to thank, praise . . . and worship Him who hath done all these things for our fathers and for ourselves: He has brought us out of bondage into freedom, out of oppression to joy, out of mourning to festal gladness, out of darkness to great light, and out of servitude to redemption; therefore let us sing before Him a new song, Alleluja.

Thus was introduced the first part of the Hallel, which the assembly now sang (Psalms cxii, 1-cxiii, 8). This hymn, which is the developed form of the Canticle of Moses,¹ begins with an invitation to praise God; continues with some general reasons for doing so—His greatness in Himself and His condescension and goodness to others; and ends with the particular reason for this praise: the redemption from Egypt. Its tenor, then, is entirely

¹ For a comparison of the two and an analysis of each cf. J. Gassner, O.S.B., *The Canon of the Mass*, 1949, pp. 55-80.

of praise and thanksgiving, prompted chiefly by the act of redemption.

The Hallel ended, and hands washed, Jesus rose from His recumbent position and took, as He sat, a cake of unleavened bread. He recited the blessing for it in the name of all. This blessing was a kind of Grace before the meal, and was the first of the two Graces, or prayers of thanks (Eucharistias). The normal blessing—though Jesus probably used one of His own—ran:

Praised be You, O Lord our God, King of the World, who causes bread to come forth from the earth.

With this the assembly must identify themselves with what had to be a loudly pronounced "Amen." This said, and the president tore off for each person a piece of the bread and gave it to him. In the ordinary Paschal meal this demonstrated that all had been included in the blessing, and knit them, before God, into one table-fellowship. During the distribution, which normally took place in silence, Jesus spoke as follows:

This is my Body that will be surrendered up for you. Do this for my commemoration.

This first Grace was the introduction to the meal itself, the eating of the Paschal Lamb. At the conclusion of the meal came the drinking of a third cup of wine over which another blessing was pronounced: this was the Grace to conclude the meal. For this Jesus rose once again from His recumbent position. He took the cup in His right hand, lifted it up a span above the table, and, with His eyes on the cup, said the Grace for all. The normal Grace ran as follows:

Praised be You, O Lord our God, King of the world, you who feed the whole world with goodness, grace and mercy,
We give thanks to You, O Lord our God, that You have caused us to take possession of a good and large land.

Have mercy, O Lord our God, on Israel, Your people, and on Jerusalem, Your city, and upon Zion, the dwelling-place of

Your glory, and upon Your altar and upon Your temple.
Praise be to You, O Lord, who builds Jerusalem.¹

The company said "Amen"; and Jesus passed round the cup, speaking the words over the wine:

This is the chalice, the New Covenant in my Blood.

The closeness of the link between the Grace and the words of Institution is clear from the re-enactment of the Last Supper receiving its name from this prayer: the Eucharist. Coming, as it did, at the solemn close of the meal, it summed up in the Jewish Pasch the events for which Israel was chiefly thankful to Jahweh, and which had already been commemorated in the Haggada and the Hallel: God's goodness, the well-spring of all benefits; His adoption of Israel as His people, which found ultimate and concrete expression in His establishing this race, once slaves, into a rich kingdom; His continual presence with them; and His promises for the future ("who builds Jerusalem"). Of ancient origin, it still followed its primitive form of a cry of admiration and joy at the Being who is just, reliable and loving, the strong Shield of Israel, and then of an account (the anamnesis), told with gratitude and admiration, of the great deeds He had wrought for His people.²

In the greatest of the Christian anaphoras,³ these themes of thanksgiving for creation and for redemption (but now, of course, for a new and fuller redemption) find magnificent expression. The scheme of these is now markedly Trinitarian: that all things come to us from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit (to whom the divine operation in the Church is, primitively, ascribed), so that we may have access through the mediation of the Son to the Father. These themes are already

¹ The form given here of this blessing is that reconstructed by L. Finkelstein, *Jewish Quart. Rev.*, '28-'29, pp. 213-17. There he shows the close correspondence between it and the (very much Christianized) *Didache* Eucharistic prayer. (On the Eucharistic character of the latter cf. R. Glover, *N.T.S.*, 1958, p. 26.) The anamnesis of Jesus' prayer was likewise, no doubt, much fraught with motifs of the New Age (cf. Schürmann, *op. cit.*, p. 57 and n. 252). But the structure and the basic theme remained the same.

² Cf. J.-P. Audet, *Revue Biblique*, 1958, pp. 371-99.

³ Of course the whole of the Canon—and not merely the Preface—is the subsequent equivalent to Jesus' Eucharistic prayer. Cf. J. Gassner, *op. cit.*, p. 48 sqq.

met with in the possibly Eucharistic prayers of the Didache; again in St Justin:

... the Eucharistic Bread, which Christ commanded us to offer ... that we should thank God for having created the world and everything in it, for the sake of mankind, and for having saved us from sin ... through Him who suffered;

in the anaphora of St Hippolytus:

We render thanks unto Thee, O God, through thy beloved Son Jesus Christ, whom in these last times Thou didst send to us as Saviour and Redeemer ... through whom Thou didst make all things.¹

In the Apostolic Constitution (*circa* 380) we already find the pattern that will be so prevalent in subsequent anaphoras: a recital of the Father's attributes; the mediation of the Son; and the history of God's providential dealings with the human race with their climax in the Incarnation and its effects. These recitals are always of thanksgiving and praise, in which the whole assembly is in conscious league with the heavenly court—no mere historical catalogues!

At this very time St Basil (probably) was compiling the anaphora which is considered to be of a particularly representative character,² and in which the Trinitarian and sacred-history themes are amply developed³ in much the same manner as in the *Apostolic Constitution*.

¹ Hippolytus' is no more than a suggested framework of an anaphora, which the celebrant then had the right to develop freely. The title of the work in which it is included, *The Apostolic Tradition*, reminds us of the Saint's intention to take the most ancient traditions known to him as his model. The Trinitarian formula is fully expressed at the end, where the intimate connexion between the Holy Spirit and the Church appears clearly. This intimate connexion is also clearly evinced in the earliest symbol of the faith known to us ("Credis in Spiritum Sanctum (praesentem) in Sancta Ecclesia ad carnis resurrectionem?"), and in the earliest form of the Apostles Creed (cf. Denziger, 1 and 2, and P. Nautin, *Je crois à l'Esprit Saint dans la sainte Eglise pour la résurrection de la chair*, Paris, 1947). The connexion in later creeds is less obvious.

² Cf. C. Vagaggini, *Il senso teologico della liturgia*, Rome, 1957, p. 136; J. Jungmann, *Missarum Solemnia*, I, p. 38 sqq.

³ It is set out with clear indication of its various themes in Vagaggini, *op. cit.* p. 136 sqq.

When we turn from these anaphoras to the present Canon of the Roman Mass, certain differences immediately appear. In it we miss the magnificent development of God's dealing with man which had, hitherto, always formed the burden of the introduction to the words of Institution. These themes, undoubtedly, are present. But piecemeal; and they lack altogether that unity of design, that broad sweep of ever-increasing insistence, that make the recitals of God's great dealings with men so moving, so thank-inspiring, so perfect a motive for our sacrifice and key to the motive of Christ's sacrifice, and so ideal an entrance to the words of Institution, in the eastern anaphoras. This is due to the comparative poverty of the Roman Prefaces, to the insertion of the Intercessory prayers into the first part of the Canon, and, so far perhaps as the people are concerned, by the recital of that part of the Canon, except for the Preface and Sanctus, silently.¹

A glance at the four accounts of the Last Supper reveals their complexity and their richness. Quite apart from their identification of Christ's "body" and "blood" with the bread and wine, we hear more or less distinct references to sacrifice, to the Servant of Isaiah who gave his life for "many" and to the Covenant. An estimate of their presence in Jesus' words will be assisted by some preliminary remarks.

The material collected in the Gospels is a record of the events and teachings of our Lord's public life. But the purpose of the collection was not primarily to furnish a mere historical dossier, but to assist the proclamation of the message Jesus had taught, which, after His death, must be taught by the apostles and their colleagues. These were only concerned, at whatever cost, to fulfil the office given them: to transmit the Truth which had broken, at last, into full radiance in the world of men, and to ensure that this radiance should never be contorted or dimmed. Evidence of this anxiety to prevent contortion is their

¹ Elucidation of these points can be found in Jungmann, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 101-9, 115 sqq., and *idem Theol. Quart.*, 1953, p. 395; Vagaggini, *op. cit.*, pp. 225, 226 ("... the language of the liturgy not understood by the people; the liturgical chant, the singing of specialists and not of the people; the recitation of the Canon in a low voice not audible by the people... from these facts, in great part, arises the chief liturgical problem of the present day"); cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 184, 185.

insistence that only a personal witness of the whole of Jesus' ministry could be admitted to Judas' place as an apostle.

And yet Jesus' life was not regarded as an inert historical specimen. It was chiefly a call to a way of life. That call He Himself had voiced in a manner delicately fitted to particular circumstances. Those circumstances had largely lapsed. His challenge and invitation would tell much less if its envelope were insisted on. The apostles' duty was to transmit the message itself: that must be preserved, come what may. But if the message shone more clearly in an altered manner of expression, a blind retention of the old envelope, though it would preserve an interesting historical detail, would serve only to hide what their whole lives were set to reveal.¹

As regards the Eucharistic texts, it is well known that they are reproductions² of the forms in use in the Church's worship of those times.

The intention [of the accounts] is to illustrate the Church's Eucharist in the light of that held by Jesus. Their purpose is to justify a contemporary practice; but they accomplish this by showing that the contemporary practice corresponds to a tradition that has, as its essential basis, Jesus' own act. Hence they do indeed describe a real historical event: only, not for its own sake, but in regard to the contemporary worship of the Church [at the time they were writing].³

Consequently there is no attempt to give colour to, or supply details of, the event—in marked contrast to the treatment of the Passion story generally.

One important conclusion that must be drawn from this is that Jesus must have prepared His disciples for the words of Institution (probably in the Haggada), or developed them

¹ Cf. especially J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, Eng. trans. 1954, and Cambier, etc., *Le Formation des Évangiles*, 1957, pp. 11–13, 70–84, 203–12.

² In Paul's and Mark's cases, perhaps abbreviated.

³ J. Betz, *Die Eucharistie in der Zeit der griechischen Väter*, I, 1955, p. 12 sqq. (No one now disputes this: cf. H. Schürmann, *Theol. Quart.*, 1951, notes 5, 15, 26). The liturgical character of the accounts is manifest from, for instance, the fact that the Paschal character of the meal is previously indicated, but not here repeated (for the ritual of the Jewish Pasch no longer determined the Church's ritual), and the tendency to make parallel the words for the bread and wine formulas (especially in Matthew).

when spoken. These developments would have been out of place in a liturgical formula, which pre-supposed them already known. A second conclusion is that we can never attain absolute certainty from our texts of the exact words Jesus used: and the uncertainty is considerably augmented by the diversity of the texts themselves in the expression, and even in the inclusion, of various themes. Even when the texts themselves, moreover, have brought us back to within a few years of Jesus' death, those few years yet constitute a rift which we cannot jump.¹

Hence the importance of recollecting that these are not merely historical documents. They witness, certainly, to a fact; but they witness, much more earnestly, to a truth. When St Matthew, for instance, added "for the remission of sins" to a former text, the taunt that he was misrepresenting Jesus by putting words into His mouth would have simply perplexed him. Here is the Christian truth, he might have said, for which I am prepared to die. Did Christ use these precise words at the Last Supper? I have no idea. Perhaps He did. Perhaps He expressed it in a different way. But every Christian, from the apostles downwards, knows that it's what He meant. How else could we use the phrase in a public service? Quench your doubt!

With these considerations in mind, we shall be immune from the impulse to treat as valueless the additions to the "earliest" text. Nor, in view of the great complexity of problems implicit in establishing such a text, shall we adhere to it too rigidly. Since the discussion of these problems would be beyond our scope, we shall adopt Schürmann's proposal for it. His text² runs as follows:

¹ St Paul's account, which shows traces of pre-Pauline features, was written down not later than A.D. 57 as the "tradition" which he had handed on to the Corinthians six years before. "Tradition" to a Rabbi, as Paul had been, would in any case have been sacrosanct. St Paul must therefore have been convinced from his first years as a Christian that this "tradition" did indeed derive from the Lord and must have compared his doctrine on it with that of the other apostles on his visits to Jerusalem. He takes us, therefore, some years behind A.D. 40.

² H. Schürmann, *Der Einsetzungsbericht*, 1955, p. 81. It would be idle to attempt even a synopsis of his arguments here. Moule describes the theory as "revolutionary . . . (by which) the Lucan Institution Narrative, so often treated as a Cinderella, is claimed to be a royal child" (*J.T.S.*, 1956, p. 112). Nevertheless he, like most reviewers, finds the case "as a whole an impressive one. It should be remarked that even if one prefers to attributes greater originality to the Marcan account, it seems no longer necessary to strike out mention of the Covenant from

And taking bread and having said the Eucharist he broke and gave to them and said:

This is my body that will be surrendered for you. Do this for my commemoration.

And likewise the chalice after the meal saying:

This (is) the chalice, the New Covenant in my blood.

This is my body. Leaving the defence of the obvious meaning of identification between "this" and "my body" to an apologetic treatment of the text,¹ we can turn our attention at once to the significance of "body". Needless to say, our success in recapturing this will depend on whether we can find the Aramaic word Jesus used. The technique of this reconstruction is far from its full development. A rigid position should not, therefore, be sought.

The evidence seems to point, almost emphatically, to the choice of *bisra*: only with the proviso that it is probably not to be thought of here as linked with *d'ma* (blood), which frequently partners it. If this partnership had existed in the original, the translator's selection of *soma* instead of *sarx* as its Greek equivalent would be inexplicable. For the Aramaic partnership denoted sacrifice, as did *sarx* with *haima*. The latter would therefore have been used to render the former, if the former had been there. We may add that it is exceedingly perilous to assume that "body" and "blood" did form a pair here (for they would have been separated by the whole meal), or even that "blood" had the same place in the wine formula as it has in the bread formula that a pair might be made possible.

The safest conclusion seems to be that the original bread formula had *bisra*; that the word did not stand in partnership with *d'ma*; that therefore it meant the whole person (considered especially in its outward manifestation), and not a part of it as

it as secondary. This was done by Jeremias (op. cit., pp. 133-5), followed by E. Löhse (*Märtyrer und Gottesknecht*, 1955, p. 124 sqq.), who spins some quite gratuitous consequences from it. Their chief reason was an alleged impossibility of Mark's Covenant phrase being re-translated into Aramaic. This "impossibility" has since been dissolved (by J. A. Emerton, *J.T.S.*, 1955, pp. 238-40).

¹ Cf. especially Betz, op. cit., pp. 54-64.

in the dichotomy of body and soul; that it possessed no immediate sacrificial connotation; but that this latter was subsequently supplied by Mark's partnering it with "blood", and thus lifting it into the sacrificial terminology, and made still more explicit by John (followed by Ignatius, Justin and others), who altered it to the more sacrificial *sarx-haima*.¹

That will be surrendered for you. It will be noticed that in our text this phrase is not provided with the parallel of "that shall be shed for you/many" in the wine formula which all the present texts, except Paul's, propose.² The addition of that phrase would once again be explained by the early Christian's conviction that Jesus' blood was shed in sacrifice, and by their anxiety that this should be reflected in their repetitions of the Last Supper. Mark's revision of the wine formula, unmistakably modelled on Exodus xxiv, 6-8, was intended to make explicit that Jesus' blood-shedding was a *sacrificial* causing of the new Covenant, just as the blood-shedding (*haima ekxein*) described in Exodus was a result of sacrifice.³

If we are right in attributing the explicitly sacrificial formulation of Jesus' words to Mark, what significance should we attach to the earlier bread formula set out above? The Servant songs of Isaiah provide the answer—and an extremely significant one.

Perhaps the precise shape of Deutero-Isaiah's own conception of the Servant cannot yet be discerned. Probably he was an individual, rather than a group. But whether he was thought of as a king-messiah or as a prophet, and whether or not he is said

¹ The more recent literature on this includes Schürmann, *Einsetz.*, pp. 18-22, 66, 107-10, 119 sqq., and notes 378, 416; Betz, *op. cit.*, p. 38 sqq.; Löhse, *op. cit.*, p. 125. Of the earlier literature the contributions of Dalman, Jeremias and Bonsirven are of particular value.

² The view that the phrase did not occur in the earliest version, but was found by Luke—perhaps in Mark, is presented most convincingly by Schürmann, *Einsetz.*, pp. 65-9, 73-80; cf. p. 112. Mark's insertion would be explained by the inevitable desire to provide a parallel to the bread formula for the wine.

³ "This is" (the blood of the Covenant) in Mark may well have been merely an alternative translation of *hime*, which the LXX translates as "Here is" in Exod. xxiv, 8; and so the echo of Exod. in Mark may be perfect. The considerations raised by Betz (*op. cit.*, pp. 26-35, and cf. his art. cit. in n. 109) of the necessity to emphasize "blood" in the chalice formula on account of the difficulties against drinking blood of the Jewish Christians probably contributed to the adoption of the Exod. formula by Mark.

Whether *haima ekxein* is sacrificial must, in each case, be determined by the context. Here the context (Exod. xxiv) gives a clearly affirmative decision.

to die, these and many other questions remain in shadow. For our present purpose it is enough to notice that two essential characteristics of the Servant are that he suffers in the place of and for others, and that he is thereby constituted the instrument by which the Covenant is renewed.¹

Mowinckel² has made it quite evident that, although the Servant was often identified with the Messiah, the methods of exegesis of the Rabbis allowed them to escape from a (to them) embarrassing attribution of inglorious suffering to their Messiah by transferring the Servant's title, but not his essential characteristic of suffering, to the Messiah. But this may not always have been the case in circles outside official Judaism.³

We have no reason to doubt that, in substance at least, the Gospels are historically correct in making Jesus prophesy His death. Although this could have been no more than the prediction of a prophet's common end, yet Mark x, 45 puts His death on the representative (therefore Servant) plane: a death for others. The phrase we are discussing probably had some previous introduction, therefore, in Jesus' teaching to the apostles. And we have already noted that our text is the liturgical distillation of a probably much ampler speech.

Once we have established that "body" in this formula means the whole person, the giving up of oneself for others is an unmistakable allusion to Isa. liii, both as to meaning (entirely), and as to the words used (in large measure).⁴

Here, Jesus was saying, is the person of whom the prophet wrote:

It was our suffering that he bore . . .

He was bruised for our sins . . .

¹ Cf. O. Cullmann, *Die Christologie des N.T.*, 1957, p. 54.

² *He that cometh*, Eng. trans., 1956.

³ Contra, W. G. Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfilment* (=2nd ed., 1953), p. 73 and n. 178. Cf. O. Cullmann, op. cit., pp. 54-9, and lit. ibid. cit.

⁴ *Didomi* can have the same sense as *paradidomi* (cf. e.g. Isa. liii, 10); *soma* (in the sense we have given it)=soul (Isa. liii, 10, 12)=person; *hyper*=anti and *peri* (in Isa. liii, 4, 10, 12)=either (i) in favour of some-one or (ii) instead of some-one (on which cf. R. Schnakenburg, *Das Heilsgeschehen bei der Taufe* . . ., 1950, p. 111). Notice especially liii, 12c, where the Hebrew verb *hara*, usually, but not always, translated as "poured out", means, in this context, precisely the same as (*para*)*didomi* (cf. Sotah, 14a and Gesenius, *Hebr. und Aram. Handwörter*, p. 612). In point of meaning (and even literally?) Jesus' words coincide almost exactly with 12c.

And by his stripes we were healed.
And Jahweh made to light upon him the iniquities of us all;
He was afflicted, but he was resigned. . . .
 Albeit he had done no violence,
 And there was no deceit in his mouth. . . .
 Though his life *be made* a sin-offering (*by him*) . . .
 A righteous one, My Servant, shall make many righteous,
 and their iniquities he shall bear.¹

In this text the third of the verbs in italics is active, the first two passive. If, in the light of Mark x, 45, we take Jesus' "will be surrendered" as predominantly an active self-offering, and if we remember the strongly sacrificial sound of this phrase ("for" and "surrendered" belong to the terminology of sacrifice),² we shall be able to see sacrifice to God—the eager recognition of His sovereignty, and the loving return for His greatness and goodness—as well as an embracement of the role of scapegoat for others, as contained in this verse.³

This (is)⁴ the chalice the new Covenant in my blood.

The old Covenant was the ground, the origin, of Israel's privileges and way of life. From it came its close relationship with God. And now a new Covenant was being ratified, a new dispensation begun. God's bestowal of His especial favour would be set in a fuller and a broader key. And this chalice—or, more particularly its contents—was this new Covenant, caused by Jesus' death.⁵

This was the new Covenant promised by Jeremiah:⁶ the promise of the eschatological era that was now introduced. But the forging of this new Covenant had been ascribed to the Servant, to him who surrendered himself for others:

I will . . . appoint thee for the covenant of the people,
 For the light of the nations.

¹ Isa. liii, in the translation of E. J. Kissane, *The Book of Isaiah*, 1943, Vol. II, p. 181 sqq.

² Other terms, also, in the Servant songs had sacrificial colouring: e.g. "sheep".

³ Cf. Schürmann, *Einsetz*, pp. 20 sqq., 117.

⁴ The omission of the copula is a Semitism.

⁵ In this formula "in" as causative: a Semitism; and "my blood" = my death.

⁶ xxx, 31-4.

I will preserve thee and appoint thee for the covenant of the people,
 To restore the land,
 To allot the heritages that were made desolate;
 To say to the prisoners: Come forth!
 To them that are in darkness: Be enlightened!¹

And now, as He passed the cup to the disciples, the Servant was speaking of the fuller age that He was about to introduce. But the new set up echo of the old. And although "in my blood" signified primarily Jesus' death, one can hardly doubt that it held allusion to that old Covenant, where blood figured so large, and endowed it with sacrificial significance (thus Exod. xxiv).

And so in these formulas Jesus made known not only that somehow He became present in the bread and wine which must be food for His disciples, but that He was in them especially as the Servant who suffered for others; as the Servant, moreover, who made possible to man a deeper intimacy with God in a fuller age; and as He who expressed His wonder and gratitude for God's nature by offering His very life blood as a sacrifice, sealing, thereby, the Covenant, and thus immeasurably enlarging the horizons of all men who would see.

Jesus, the Jesus who died for others as a sacrifice, had entered into intimate association with the apostles. Take you and eat. But He also commanded that this should be repeated: *Do this for my commemoration*. Commemoration was a well-known exercise in Jewry. The ceremony they were then enacting had it as its very purpose. In the twelfth chapter of Exodus the author, after recounting God's institution of the first Pasch, immediately continues:

You are to observe this day as a commemoration of the past, a day when you keep holiday in the Lord's honour, generation after generation; a rite never to be abrogated.

¹ Isa. xlii, 6, and xlix, 8, 9, in trans. cit.

Commemoration, though, meant more than a mere animadversion: its purpose was to keep efficacious and vivid their relationship with a strong and loving God, who tended them still as His flock, and who would rescue them one day in the future. Himself and His saving acts, in their past, present and future significance, were the objects of a Jewish anamnesis.

The Commemoration of Himself that Jesus commanded was to "do this". "Do" here means to perform a liturgical ceremony: a Hebrew usage.¹ The rite Jesus had performed, the apostles must perform also. And thus they would make a commemoration, rendering actively present the saving act of the new Covenant in a manner which they themselves, Jesus' emissaries, would understand and teach. The old Paschal rite had rendered present God's saving acts of the old Covenant. But, as in so many other of its features, the manner of re-presenting in the old was immeasurably transcended in the new.

The relationship of the Commemoration with Jesus' death is brought into special prominence by Paul: Do this, whenever you drink it, for a commemoration of me.

For whenever you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord until He come.

It is, of course, entirely consonant with St Paul's theology of the Passion that he gives special prominence to Jesus' death as the subject of the anamnesis. Betz draws attention to this, and also to St Paul's aim of correcting in this way the hedonism of the Corinthians' enactment of the Eucharist. Both these factors contributed to this special mention of Jesus' death. Finally he points to the fact that

the command to repeat [the rite] was couched in language that clearly recalled the formulas used for founding the old [hellenistic] memorials of the dead. Well acquainted with the hellenistic world, these foundations and their formulas were certainly known to him. Under their influence the similar-sounding "foundation" [*Stiftungsbefehl*] of the Last Supper may have brought the death of Jesus more sharply to his mind. In any case the death of Jesus is especially prominent for Paul as the content of the Last Supper. And with this is connected Paul's

¹ Exod. xiii, 5; 1 Chron. xxiii, 24; Num. iv, 35, 39, have *habad*, meaning "to perform a religious service", which the LXX translates by *poiein*.

conception of Jesus' death as a sacrifice and the Last Supper as a sacrificial meal.¹

But even for St Paul the Last Supper is not the representation of Jesus' sacrificial death only, although this rightly occupies the forefront. Col. i, 1-12, Phil. ii, 5-11 and 1 Tim. iii, 16, which are acknowledged to be inspired and influenced by the Eucharist, include mention of the Pre-existence, the Incarnation and the glorification of Christ, as well as His death, so that, for St Paul also, the Last Supper was the representation of the whole of Jesus' saving work, with its climax in His death and, inseparably connected with this, His resurrection.²

And so the Rescuer came. He comes still: Himself present in His sacrifice, Himself in His saving work. An anticipation of the day when He will come fully, anon.

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¹ Op. cit., pp. 152, 153. The similarity of formulation with the Hellenistic memorial rites has led some exegetes to believe that the content is to be explained against the Hellenistic background, and not the Jewish: that the Eucharist was to be, therefore, nothing more than a memorial of the dead. Jeremias himself was of this persuasion in the first edition of his work (*Abendmahlswoorte*, pp. 58-9); but in the second edition (op. cit., pp. 159 sqq.), while recognizing that the formulation may have been influenced by the Hellenistic environment, he asserts that the idea itself must be interpreted as Semitic. This second position is the one usually adopted by later writers, and accords well with our knowledge of St Paul's habit of transposing his doctrine into the current idiom of contemporary Hellenistic culture (cf. J. Dupont, *Gnosis*, 1950). It should be noticed, also, that the memorial for the dead also formed part of the Semitic ritual for the dead (cf. van Unnick, *Ned. Theol. Tijds.*, 1950, p. 370).

We should mention, finally, that Jeremias' interpretation of anamnesis as a reminder of God ("so that God may remember me") rather than of men, has been shown not to be deducible from the LXX or the N.T. use of the word. Both are possible. And the context must decide in each case (van Unnick, art. cit. p. 371 sqq., and D. Jones, *J.T.S.*, 1959, pp. 183-91).

² Paul's phrase—"of the Lord until He come"—deserves a closer study than we can give it here. The title of "the Lord" not only had a distinctly liturgical tinge in early Christendom, but it also designated Jesus especially as the risen, glorified, and ruling Christ. The paramount hope of the Christians was to be "with Christ", which meant sharing in his "glorified" state. The Parousia ("until he come") was chiefly regarded as the event that achieved this; and the Eucharist was seen as a kind of anticipation of this event (cf. Cullman, op. cit., pp. 209-41, and J. Dupont, *Sun Christoi*, 1952).

THE CHURCH AND THE ARTIST

THE Church, as the one Ark of Salvation for all, is bound to be interested in art, as one of the human activities that can help towards man's perfection. It is, in fact, to use the traditional scholastic terminology, one of the five intellectual virtues—good habits perfecting the intellect on the natural level in relation to its proper object, the true, just as the moral virtues perfect the will in relation to *its* proper object, the good, while the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, perfect intellect and will alike in relation to their *supernatural* object, the beatific vision of God in heaven.

Of these five intellectual virtues, three are speculative: understanding, which leads us to a grasp of the first principles of truth; science, or knowledge, which deals with truth known by demonstration in the light of those first principles; and wisdom, which sets the truths so acquired in order and in relation with one another, and offers us, in metaphysics and theology, the ultimate explanations of our place in God's universe. As charity is the most important of the theological virtues, so wisdom is the most important of the speculative intellectual virtues—the most important and the most neglected in modern education, which is too often content to stop short at science, to its great impoverishment.

But there are two other intellectual virtues, practical ones, concerned, as the speculative ones are not, with man's external activity, with doing and with making. These virtues of the man of action are prudence, which teaches us the right way of doing things, and art, which teaches us the right way of making things, whether for use or for contemplation of their beauty. These two differ, in that prudence is a hybrid virtue, located indeed in the intellect, but dealing with the material of morality, human acts, and bearing not only on the intellect but on the will and the appetites—a complete virtue, tending to make the whole man good. But art is an incomplete virtue, not concerned with the moral goodness of man; its perfection is found not in man at all but in his works, and consists not in making the artist himself good but in making his art true.

What interests the Church, then, about the artist is not the morality of his actions but the truth of his work: that is, its conformity with the divine truth she herself teaches, its conformity, in other words, with her mind, which is the mind of Christ who lives in her. The artist can help her in the expression of her mind by the statement of the truths she proclaims: in visual form, as in painting, sculpture, metalwork, textile design or architecture; in audible form, as in music; in verbal form, whether the words be written or spoken, as in literature, drama or oratory. This list is not meant to be exhaustive; one might add, for example, mime, ballet, photography, radio and television production, and a host of other art forms.

But where the Church chiefly needs the artist's help is in her worship, in the priestly liturgy concentrated about the eucharistic sacrifice, in the sacraments and sacramentals with which she sanctifies every phase of human life, and in all that appertains to them. Here she has jobs for architects, painters, sculptors, designers in glass or metal, weavers, embroiderers, musicians, writers, poets, just as she has them for bakers and vintners and chandlers.

In the past she has been well served; in all the cultural history of Europe the finest work has been done for her, for the glory of God and the salvation of souls. What of the present and the future? Since the Industrial Revolution, at least, there has undeniably appeared a cleavage between the Church and the artist, which may well have its origins much further back, in the Renaissance, when the artist began to think less of the glory of God and the needs of the Christian community than of the glory of the wealthy secular patron and the gratification of his own personal taste and judgement. However that may be, the cleavage is now so pronounced that it was not thought remarkable that one of the papers read before a recent regional conference of the Newman Association on the arts should have for its title "The Artist's Case Against the Church". To the modern artist, it seems, the Church is an unsatisfactory patron. She has never heard of the Industrial Revolution; she is unaware that the age of craftsmanship has been superseded by the age of mechanized mass-production, and cannot adapt herself to this, as the artist has; she fails to give commissions to the

"formative artists" of the day, or to accord to them the status to which they feel themselves entitled; she is out of touch, she is a back number. It was even said, rather curiously, that the clergy are particularly to blame because, coming for the most part from the lower middle class, they cannot appreciate the art produced, apparently, by people out of some upper drawer. Our churches are still shaped as they were in feudal times, and are unsuited to an egalitarian society and to the demands of liturgical reform; and they are overloaded with ornament in the worst possible taste. And so on. Are these criticisms justified? I doubt it. Thirty years ago I remember making just such criticisms myself; now I should regard them as a bit of undergraduate impertinence.

If there is a cleavage between the Church and the artist, is it entirely the Church's fault, or has the Church, perhaps, a case against the artist? I think she has, and it is time somebody said so. To say that the Church has cut herself off from the "formative artist" is rather like saying, with the parents of a recruit on parade, "everyone is out of step except our Johnny": a visit to Cavendish Square should dispose of this objection. Many other reproaches levelled against us are quite unjustified. Considering the poverty of our resources in the last hundred years, and the necessity of concentrating them on other objects, it is really remarkable how many fine, inspiring, worthily adorned churches we have in this country, and those going up today are mostly no discredit to us. It simply is not true that the majority are ugly and tawdry. Some of them are over-ornamented, because they reflect the opulent taste of the Victorian times in which they were built; but when they are redecorated more plainly their general lines and proportions often emerge as far more noble and dignified than the creations of the modern architect. The current vogue for what is called simplicity with which we are expected to comply too often springs not, as we are told, from the dictates imposed by modern methods and materials, but from the poverty of invention of the architect, who, not having mastered the new techniques or learnt to deploy them, is content to produce not simplicity but starkness. But true simplicity is not a kind of architectural nudism: it may be found even in an ornate Baroque church, where there is a single unifying

theme, binding together the various elements in a highly complicated but well-organized design. Modern materials would lend themselves readily to bold experiments of this nature, but these must await the emergence of an architect who is something more than a constructional engineer.

Again, we are told that our churches are too long and narrow; the altar is too remote. This, it is suggested, was well enough for the Middle Ages, when God was thought of as a distant feudal overlord; but in these democratic days we must learn to chum up with Him, setting His altar in the middle of a wide arena, with the congregation on all sides like the spectators at a boxing match.

The artist, you see, is as free with his advice as with his criticism; but in giving it I think he forgets his place. Like the gentleman in Whitehall who knows best what is good for us all, he tells the Church what she ought to want. But the Church knows perfectly well what she wants, and it is his job to give her just that; she does not pay him to fob her off with his own fads and fancies, many of which are inconsistent with her own declared requirements. It is for the Church, not for any individual, to say what form a church should take and how it should be furnished, and it is for artists and architects, however eminent, to comply with the regulations of the Congregation of Rites, whether they like them or not. For example: in how many modern churches, especially abroad, is the Blessed Sacrament reserved, as the Church requires, in a tabernacle fixed to the high altar, the most conspicuous place and the noblest in the church, so splendidly ornamented as to stir the people's piety and devotion? I have myself seen it, in Germany and Belgium, relegated to a small cupboard in the back wall, deliberately removed from the drab little altar where Mass is celebrated—as if the Blessed Sacrament were unimportant apart from the people's communion, and as if that were the climax of the Mass, which it is not.

It is to avoid such Protestant errors that the Church insists on obedience to her established rules on the part of those whom she employs—and charges the bishops with the task of enlightening artists and architects on these matters. But are they prepared to submit to such episcopal education and confess

themselves in need of enlightenment? Will they do what they are told? Or do they rather expect the Church to take orders from them as the experts, the creative interpreters of a new age? It is perhaps not without significance that the modern architect at least, if not the artist, no longer has *patrons* but *clients*, and that the original meaning of the word "client" is "dependant, retainer, or vassal". Who is the feudal overlord today?

This is a period when knowledge and skill are so specialized that we tend to kowtow to the self-proclaimed expert in his own department, even when common sense cries out that the expert, as so often, does not know his job. And in the matter of church building, God knows, the average priest is meek enough, deferring to his architect against his own better judgement. I am convinced that in the majority of cases where a church is a bad church you will find that if the priest has been at fault it has been only in giving the architect a free hand and allowing him to produce a design which may or may not be in line with contemporary trends but is certainly at variance with the Church's traditional requirements.

Conformity to tradition is one of the requisites demanded by Canon Law; but it is hardly characteristic of the modern artist, who too often seems to think there is nothing he can learn from the past. Here is an illustration. Two years ago I spent my summer holiday travelling through five European countries, visiting a great number of churches of all periods from the eighth century to the present day; it was an immense enlargement of the mind. But when, on my return home, I spoke of it to a member of the local City Architect's staff, he replied disdainfully that, for his part, he never looked at a building more than twenty years old. Yet the past can teach us much; not least two things conspicuously absent from the dull, tatty packing-case erections for which his department is responsible: I mean, first, architectural good manners; and secondly, and above all, the good proportion in which beauty of form so largely consists.

The modern artist has come to terms with an age in which these things are despised, an age in which the old craftsmanship is being extinguished and the new methods are being applied as yet without originality or creative imagination. The Church

does not sell *her* soul so easily. There is no particular virtue in "contemporary" clichés, and she, who is timeless, can afford to wait for better things. She has seen craftsmanship extinguished many a time, and can recognize this, from her long experience, as a sure presage of cultural decay; but again and again she has seen the embers kindle anew. If, in each intervening Dark Age, there is nothing but those embers for her to use, she will use them; but she will always wait confidently for the first flicker of the new flame, ready to nurse it when it comes. Fashions mean nothing to her; all that matters is the glory of God and the salvation of souls; and she will not permit the artist to tell her that he knows more about these than she does.

The Mass for the Dedication of a Church begins with the words of Jacob when he woke from his dream of the angels' ladder at Bethel: "*Terribilis est locus iste*: What a fearsome place is this! This can be nothing other than the house of God, this is the gate of heaven; it shall be called God's palace." Any Catholic church which does not give the same impression is to that extent an architectural failure. A church is not a boxing-arena or a canteen, still less a mere functional enclosure for so many hundred people, like that new underground shelter at Lourdes. It is the seat and home of God's Majesty, a source of awe and wonder and mystery, of reverence and love, and built for Him, not for us, though we may seek audience of Him there. It is a replica of the Heavenly City, the New Jerusalem, where the ransomed souls dwell for ever in the blaze of the Beatific Vision, brought down to us, radiant and resplendent as a bride adorned with all magnificence for her royal Spouse. It is indeed the gate admitting us to heaven, a lovely tabernacle that should make us faint and long for the courts of the Lord. That is surely what must happen when any man of sensibility crosses the threshold of one of the great churches of the past, be it Ravenna, Chartres or Vierzehnheiligen. When the modern expert has learnt to handle his new techniques in such a way as to produce the same numinous effect, the Church may be persuaded to recognize him as a formative artist with whom she can do business; but even then it will be on her own terms. In the meantime, if he would speak with her, it must be not in his brash modern jargon but in the ancient language that is hers, the

language of humility and reverence and mystery, for in no other can they be brought to an understanding.

DOUGLAS CARTER

A PHILOSOPHER OF COMMON SENSE

PROFESSOR G. E. MOORE, who died in October of last year, was a truly great philosopher whose thought and personal influence have helped to fashion the philosophical outlook of the leading minds in English-speaking countries for the past fifty years. He went to Cambridge in 1892, as a classical scholar, but soon acquired an interest in philosophical speculation, as a result of discussions which took place between a number of brilliant scholars whose names were to become famous in later years; in addition to Moore, they included John Maynard Keynes, Lytton Strachey, R. S. Shepherd, David Garnett, D. H. Lawrence and Bertrand Russell—men whom Keynes was to describe as “the last of the Utopians”. In the years that followed, Moore studied the philosophy of Kant and attended the lectures of the moral philosopher Sidgwick, the psychologists James Ward and Stout, and McTaggart, who professed absolute Idealism.

At the close of the nineteenth century Idealism still held the field in British philosophy, but, with its dogmatic assertions and its application of a preconceived theory of knowledge, it was out of touch with the scientific temper of the new century, and the need for specialization and for exact scientific analysis. The first real attack upon Idealism came from Moore in 1903, and was published in *Mind* as “The Refutation of Idealism”. It took the form of an investigation into the so-called Principle of Immanence, that *esse is percipi*, without considering the Idealist conclusion that *esse* is also *percipere*.¹ In later years Moore admitted that his article was confused and mistaken on many points; yet it was generally acclaimed, in the words of Ducasse, as a “classical article, commensurate in importance with the celebrated proposition it attacks”.

¹ On this point, cf. Sillem, *George Berkeley*, pp. 180, 181. (London, 1957.)

Even greater acclaim was accorded to another work, *Principia Ethica*, which Moore also published in the same year. Upon its publication he was received as the prophet of a new age, and Keynes described its effect in glowing terms: "For us, Moore completely ousted McTaggart, Lowes Dickinson and Russell. The influence was not only overwhelming; it was exciting, exhilarating, the beginning of a renaissance, the opening of a new heaven on a new earth."¹ Few ethical treatises receive, or merit, such praise. Moore's work was an attempt to defend the autonomy of ethics by showing that the good, the fundamental ethical concept, could not be reduced to anything non-ethical, whether, as with Kant, supporting obligation with the concept of freewill—a concept which Moore regarded as metaphysical—or, more commonly, reducing ethical values to the level of the empirical concepts of natural science, as in the evolutionary ethics of Spencer.

Moore held the view that, while the study of ethics may have a practical value, in itself it remains disinterested, seeking the truth for its own sake and proceeding by the analysis of the concepts and propositions normally used in the ethical statements of common sense. Apart from the *bona utilia*, the things which are good as means to an end, everything that is good is good intrinsically; but the quality of goodness is simple, indefinable and non-natural, so that a judgement of the form, "X is intrinsically good" can neither be proved nor disproved. The colour yellow is indefinable in itself, for otherwise one who had never seen the actual colour would yet know what it looked like. In an analogous way, goodness is indefinable because it cannot be analysed in terms of anything else; and yet we can still know what it is just as we can know what yellow is. Accordingly the proposition that something is good or bad in itself becomes a synthetic proposition, to be grasped only through intuition and not through any "natural" experience, whether through the senses or through some kind of psychological introspection. The answer to the question, "Is X intrinsically good?" can only be found if one first takes the thing, X, in absolute isolation (unrelated, that is, to what is desirable, or pleasurable, or biologically suitable, or willed by God); the thing must then

¹ J. M. Keynes, *Two Memoirs*, p. 82. (London, 1949.)

be carefully and exactly distinguished, to ensure that we have it before the mind, and not some other thing. Once this isolation and distinction has been achieved, then all that remains is for the mind simply to inspect the thing, to see if it, alone, possesses the characteristic *good* or not. Various considerations may help to determine this recognition; but in itself it remains unprovable, since goodness is a simple and ultimate quality.

It is only by reference to the intrinsically good that such terms as right and wrong, value and obligation, become significant; they apply in the field of practical ethics the ultimate standard of the intrinsically good, drawing upon empirical data and inductive evidence which cannot in itself be specifically ethical; and here Moore put forward an idealistic, if hesitant, utilitarianism: we have a moral obligation to do that which, in the circumstances, will achieve the greatest balance possible of good over evil. Various possible lines of conduct offer themselves to us as alternatives, but, since we can have no certainty about their results, we cannot hope to obtain certainty about our moral obligation; left with this uncertainty, we can reasonably decide that the moral standards generally recognized in common sense are as likely to be correct as any other.¹ Where problems of conduct were concerned, Moore showed a lack of interest that might surprise one accustomed to traditional moral philosophies; at the end of the *Principia*, however, he decided that "Personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments include *all* the greatest, and *by far* the greatest, goods we can imagine"; and, in fact, the cult of friendship dominated the Bloomsbury Group and became the religion of its members, finding its expression in the novels of Virginia Woolf and E. M. Forster.

Moore himself has been described as a philosopher's philosopher, and the description is accurate in that he was stimulated to philosophize not by a consideration of the world or the sciences, but rather by what other philosophers had said about these things. From his early years, when he heard McTaggart solemnly propounding the theory that time was unreal, he had felt impelled to argue against him and on behalf of common-sense realism. The term "common sense" is to be applied pri-

¹ Cf. Alan White, *G. E. Moore*, p. 147. (Oxford, 1958.) Ewing, "British Ethical Thought" in *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*. (London, 1957.)

marily to the view of the Universe that nearly every person will hold, and, while it is not in itself philosophical, it is directly relevant to philosophy, since the most important task of philosophy is to provide a general description of the whole Universe. In the view of common sense, the Universe certainly contains both material objects and acts of consciousness. The vast majority of material objects are unconscious, and all of them are such that they may exist even when we are not conscious of them; indeed, there may have been a time when conscious acts were attached to no material bodies anywhere in the Universe. Further, both material objects and conscious acts alike exist in time. These are simply facts, and we have certain knowledge of them. There may be other facts, in addition to these, and one of the tasks of philosophy is to bring these other facts to light.

The common-sense view, then, relates to the Universe, but does not claim to be a general description of the whole Universe. Some will add further elements, and then claim that the additions, too, are part of common sense; Moore suggests¹ that belief in God, and in a future life, are typical instances of such additions, which he maintains cannot be justified as part of the common-sense view of the world; and elsewhere he states explicitly that "It is an important point in my position, that I differ from all philosophers who have held that there is good reason to suppose that there is a God at all, or to suppose that we, human beings, shall continue to exist and to be conscious after the death of our bodies."² These views, while being, to his mind, unjustified, do not contradict common sense in the way in which some sceptical philosophers have contradicted it, whether by denying that we can have knowledge of material objects and mental acts, or by denying their existence itself. It follows that, if the first problem in philosophy is to give a description of the whole Universe, the second problem will be to prove that your description is true and to refute all others. In practice, however, many philosophers make no attempt to give a general description, but concentrate instead upon some subordinate question, such as the attempt to define the difference

¹ *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 17, 18. (London, 1953.)

² *Defence of Common Sense*, Point III. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 2nd series, p. 193.

between material objects and conscious acts. Of particular importance is that part of philosophy which is concerned with knowledge, whether as a psychological process or as the logical enquiry into the meaning of truth and the reasons for belief.

Moore's own position was developed in the lectures which he gave at Cambridge three times a week for almost thirty years; while most of his published work was due to requests from the Aristotelean Society of London to read papers or to take part in Symposia. He concentrated his attention on questions relating to the nature and the reality of our sense perceptions. Are we able to perceive sense data? Do we perceive the physical object through these data? Is the physical object simply a collective name for sense data? Questions of that sort aroused a new interest in a problem which has always attracted the attention of British philosophers, faithful followers of Hume. Moore's own approach closely resembled that of Reid, as Mr White's recent critical study has shown (notably in Chapter II, dealing with the criteria of common sense, and in Chapter IX in the section devoted to Reid).

The paper called "A Defence of Common Sense" began with a lengthy statement which is reducible to this: Many other human beings, apart from myself, have often known what I know, when I say, "I am a human being", or, "The mantelpiece is nearer to me than the bookcase", or, "The earth has existed for many years past". There are many physical and mental facts of that sort, which are included in the common-sense view of the world. That view is certainly correct and true, and the propositions extracted from it are equally true, provided they are taken in their ordinary or popular meaning and not distorted into a Pickwickian sense. They are ordinary, normal, everyday statements, and when we make them we know what we mean, in the sense that we understand them; yet we do *not* know what they mean, in the sense that we do not know the analysis of what they mean. It is no part of the business of philosophy to attack such propositions, which express plain matters of fact; indeed, a philosophical theory which is logically inconsistent with the known facts should be abandoned, since it is demonstrably false. Unfortunately, says Moore, the history of philosophy shows that "philosophers have been

able to hold sincerely, as part of their philosophical creed, propositions inconsistent with what they themselves *knew* to be true".¹

While the philosopher is not entitled to question the truth of common-sense beliefs, he is entitled to analyse their meaning; and analysis largely consists in giving reasons for belief. Moore himself concentrated on giving reasons for accepting or rejecting the statements made by other philosophers; but an essential and much-neglected preliminary duty was to clarify the meaning which those philosophers attached to their statements. In many cases this clarification resembled the method of Socrates as Plato has recorded it, in that Moore would take a proposition of a certain philosopher and demonstrate that it contradicted another of his propositions, or that it was incompatible with a premise of common sense. He believed that the assent which philosophers gave to the proposition that clarity and distinctness are essential, was notional more often than real, and held that the majority of philosophical difficulties and disagreements were due to a very simple cause: to the attempt to answer questions, without first having discovered *what* question it was to which an answer was desired. In the Preface to *Principia Ethica* Moore said:

I do not know how far this source of error would be done away, if philosophers would *try* to discover what question they were asking, before they set about to answer it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult; we may often fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we make a definite attempt to do so. But I am inclined to think that in many cases a resolute attempt would be sufficient to ensure success; so that, if only this attempt were made, many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements would disappear. At all events, philosophers seem in general not to make the attempt; and, whether in consequence of this omission or not, they are constantly attempting to prove that "Yes" or "No" will answer questions, to which neither answer is correct, owing to the fact that what they have before their minds is not one question but several.

To think is to ask oneself questions and to seek to find the

¹ *Defence of Common Sense*, p. 203.

answers to them. To think clearly it is necessary to see exactly *what* the question is to which an answer is sought. Failure to act upon this seeming truism often results in the offering of evidence which is irrelevant to the question under discussion; hence it is that the philosopher must concentrate upon the true method of questioning and of analysis, and upon the principles to be observed, rather than upon the obtaining of correct answers. Moore gave an instance of this, at the end of *Principia Ethica*: "I have endeavoured rather to show exactly what is the meaning of the question, and what difficulties must consequently be faced in answering it, than to prove that any particular answers are true." Again, while admitting that his judgements did not display the system and symmetry which are wont to be required of philosophers, he went on to remark that: "We have no title whatever to assume that the truth on any subject-matter will display such symmetry as we desire to see, or that it will possess any particular form of unity. To search for unity and system, at the expense of truth, is not the business of philosophy, however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers."

With such convictions, it is not surprising that he did not offer any sort of philosophical system, and, when we consider these statements in conjunction with his empirical instincts, we can understand his deep hostility towards metaphysics of all kinds. In one of his earliest papers, he expressed a belief which he never found reason to deny: "The region of the incompletely known is the favourite abode of a metaphysical monstrosity. In plain language, where facts are not completely understood, some short-sighted metaphysical theory is generally introduced as affording an easy road past the difficulties which stand in the way of a thorough investigation."¹ It is worth observing that, to more than one British philosopher, scholasticism has appeared as synonymous with metaphysical obscurantism: thus, for example, Professor Ramsay: "The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from laziness and woolliness, is *scholasticism*, the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise, and trying to fit it into an exact logical category."²

Without doubt, the method of analysis is difficult and

¹ *Freedom. Mind*, Vol. 7 (1898).

² *Foundations of Mathematics*, p. 269 (1931).

wearisome, and often fruitless. In one of his papers, after devoting about ten pages of enquiry into the meaning of the question, "What reason have we for belief in the existence of other people?" Moore admitted that:

I have constantly found that I was confusing one question with another, and that, where I had thought that I had a good reason for some assertion, I had in reality no good reason. The question what are good reasons for a particular conclusion, and what are bad, is one upon which philosophers have disagreed as much as on any other question. For one and the same conclusion different philosophers have given incompatible reasons; and conversely different philosophers have maintained that one and the same fact is a reason for incompatible conclusions. When we have taken great pains to assure ourselves that our own reasoning is correct, and especially when we know that a great many other philosophers agree with us, we are apt to assume that the arguments of those philosophers, who have come to a contradictory conclusion, are scarcely worthy of serious consideration. It is not easy to avoid mistaking bad reasons for good, and therefore no process, however laborious, which is in the least likely to help us in avoiding this should be evaded; the philosopher must take pains to investigate any source from which it is even possible that error might arise.¹

There is no occasion now to consider the various applications of Moore's belief, that analysis is one of the main tasks of philosophy; taken in itself, its truth is unquestionable, even if Moore's own enquiries seldom brought positive results, and even though more recent linguistic analysts have earned the derisive comment of Dr Ewing, that they pursue analysis as an end in itself, and devote most of their time to sharpening a philosophical knife which they rarely use to cut anything.² The scholastic philosopher would say, as Canon Hawkins has said more than once, that positive results cannot be expected from the philosopher whose field of analysis is limited by Hume's empiricism.³

¹ *Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception*. Philosophical Studies, p. 39.

² *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, p. 77 (1957).

³ *The Criticism of Experience*, pp. 36, 37 (1945). *Crucial Problems of Modern Philosophy*, Chapter IV (1957).

Moore's influence can still be seen, in the inspiration which he gave to philosophers to apply themselves to clarity and exactness of expression. Those who attended the meetings of the Aristotelean Society at which he was present, have testified to the effect upon them of his repeated insistence that what mattered, before all else, was that they should be quite clear about the meaning of their statements. From the renowned philosopher to the veritable tyro, each was made conscious that an unguarded remark would be followed by a loud thumping of the table from Moore and the demand, "What ON EARTH do you mean by that?" Alternatively, in the silence that followed some seemingly profound remark, Moore would flatly state his conviction that it was utter nonsense. Again, in his own lectures, to which he gave long hours of preparation, it seemed that he was doing his thinking in front of the class; as Miss Stebbing remarked, in her essay on Moore's influence,¹ he showed his students what thinking philosophically was, by doing that thinking in front of them.

No one can doubt that such an example is admirable, even though those of us who are engaged in the very different task of lecturing to seminary students, with a number of treatises to be "done", might feel unable to emulate him, whether from sheer want of ability or from a distrust of its effectiveness. For that matter Wittgenstein (who had attended Moore's lectures at Cambridge, and was to succeed him as Professor of Philosophy there) had a style of lecturing even less suited to seminary life; in the Memoir recently published, Professor Malcolm has described it:

Sometimes there were prolonged periods of silence, with only an occasional mutter from Wittgenstein and the stillest attention from others. During these silences he was extremely tense and active. His gaze was concentrated, his face was alive; his hands made arresting movements; his expression was stern. No one could fail to perceive that he strained his will as well as his intellect to the utmost. He was always exhausted by his lectures. He was also revolted by them. He felt disgusted with what he

¹ *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, p. 531. (Northwestern University, Evanston, 1942.)

had said and with himself. Often he would rush off to the cinema immediately after the class had ended.¹

Moore, then, was a great philosopher because he combined the keenest analytical and critical powers with a capacity for simple and direct expression. His adherence to common sense, coupled with his insistence upon the importance of philosophical analysis, merit not only the recognition recently accorded him, as the leading British philosopher of the last half-century,² but also the attention of those scholastic philosophers who would wish to find some common ground, and some points of contact, with their British contemporaries.

JAMES MOLLOY

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

HOLY WEEK READINGS

During Holy Week must the celebrant read texts, such as the Introit or Gradual, which are sung by the choir? (X. X.)

REPLY

In the Instruction (§6) of the *S.R.C.* appended to the decree *Maxima* for the restoration of the *Ordo* of Holy Week (1955), it is stated that in the solemn Mass each day of Holy Week (as well as in the Good Friday service) the celebrant does not read privately the parts which "the deacon or subdeacon or lector sing or read in virtue of their office". The celebrant, then, is to omit the private reading only of the special parts assigned to these ministers (Lessons and the Gospel). Nothing is said about parts that are sung by the choir, and it is expressly stated in the evening Mass of Maundy Thursday (§7) that the celebrant reads the Introit, although it is sung by the choir. And so it is

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Norman Malcolm, pp. 26, 27. (Oxford, 1958.)

² Broad: *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, p. 50 (1957).

the opinion of commentators that within Mass the celebrant may not omit the reading of the texts sung by the choir. Outside Mass, however, e.g. in the Palm Sunday procession, during the Improperia on Good Friday, the rubrics make it clear that the sacred ministers do not repeat texts sung by the choir. All through the functions as described in *Ritus Simplex*, it is made clear that such texts, outside Mass, are recited by the celebrant only when singers are lacking.

ROSY VESTMENTS

What are the rubrics about rose-coloured vestments? If the Sunday Mass at which they are used is repeated during the following week may they be used? (C.)

REPLY

The only reference in the rubrics to rosy vestments occurs in the Ceremonial of Bishops (II, xiii, 11) where it is stated that on the third Sunday of Advent it is the custom to use the clothing of the altar and vestments of the celebrant "*coloris violacei in defectu rosacei*", and *S.R.C.* (in 1901) replied affirmatively to the query whether rosy vestments may be used on the third Sunday of Advent and the fourth of Lent, not only at Solemn Mass but also at private Masses and at the Office (*S.R.C.*, 4084³). Rosy vestments seem to have come into use on the third Sunday of Advent because the Pope blessed the golden rose on that day, and also because they were considered less penitential than violet vestments for a day that had an element of joy in the Liturgy (*Gaudete* Sunday). By analogy the usage spread to a corresponding Sunday in Lent, *Laetare* Sunday. The question about the use of the vestments on a weekday can arise only for Monday, Tuesday and Thursday of the week after the third Sunday of Advent, the other days are Ember Days and have their own special Mass formularies. The query cannot arise at all in Lent when the Mass formulary of Sunday is not used again on any weekday. It is a moot point if the rosy

vestments may be used on these Advent weekdays. A private reply to the Bishop of Menevia from *S.R.C.* (dated 7 November 1935) said "Yes" "ad mentem rubricarum Caerem. Ep. II, xiii, 11, et Missalis Romani, tit. xix, 6". But these references do not settle the point. Several commentators deny that the rosy vestments may be used except on Sundays, which alone are mentioned in the rubric of the Ceremonial and in the query to *S.R.C.* (4084³). Other authorities (e.g. Vavasseur-Haegy, Wuest-Mullaly) hold the opposite view, but do not give any satisfactory basis for it. The Roman Universal *Ordo* (1959) gives no indication of the use of rosy vestments except on the third Sunday of Advent.

CONOPAEUM IN LENT

Is it correct to use a violet conopaeum over the tabernacle all through Lent? (P. W.)

REPLY

The colour of the conopaeum is not regulated by the liturgical season. It should be either the colour of the Blessed Sacrament, white; or else the colour of the Office of the day (*S.R.C.*, 3035¹⁰). Of course black is never used, so on All Souls' Day the colour is violet. The same rule obtains for a Requiem function.

PAPAL BLESSING

In the form for the giving of the Apostolic Blessing given in the Roman Pontifical it says the *Litterae Apostolicae* are to be read before the blessing is given. What are these *Litterae Apostolicae* and where can I find them? (J. H., Ghana.)

REPLY

The *Litterae Apostolicae* was the document which gave a bishop the faculty to impart the Apostolic Blessing before the

Code of Canon Law was issued. The faculty is now given by *C.J.C.*, canon 914, and a change must be made in the form of announcement of the indulgence (cf. *S. Penitentiary*, 20 July 1942). Some such form as this is used, "Attentis facultatibus in Jure Canonico expressis, Rev^{ms} Dominus Dominus N., Dei et Apostolicae Sedis gratia hujus sanctae N. Ecclesiae Antistes, dat et concedit . . ." When giving this Apostolic Blessing at the end of Mass the bishop is at his throne and wears all the Mass vestments including the gloves. If he is an archbishop he wears also the pallium if he wore it at Mass (*S.R.C.*, 3605⁸). If the bishop did not pontificate, but only presided, he wears cope and mitre (and no gloves) if he had worn these during Mass; but if he had presided in cappa, he vests in amice, pectoral cross, stole and cope, and uses mitre and crozier, for the blessing.

COMMUNION PLATE

Is it correct for the altar server to hold the Communion plate for the communicants? Is not this the deacon's function at high Mass only? What if sacred particles should fall on the plate? (J. F.)

REPLY

The Instruction of the Congregation of the Sacraments that first ordered the use of a Communion plate *in addition to*—not instead of—a Communion cloth (in 1929) directed that it be held by the communicants; at high Mass the deacon was to hold the paten. As this rubric about the plate gave rise, in some places, to difficulties, certain bishops sought and obtained from the Holy See an indult allowing the plate to be carried from person to person by the server. In a letter to the Archbishop of Liverpool in 1931 the Congregation expressed approval of this practice, and now rubricians hold that no special permission is needed to adopt this method, if it is found more convenient. If a sacred particle of noticeable size should fall on the plate the priest may then and there, for safety's sake, transfer it to the ciborium; for tiny particles this is not necessary as the plate is

carried to the altar by the server after the Communion and handed to the priest to purify. Needless to say the server should be trained to carry the plate properly so as to prevent small particles from falling off it.

BLESSED SACRAMENT PRAYER

Please explain clearly the rubric about the Blessed Sacrament prayer at the altar of Exposition. Is there any change owing to the new rubrics? (Anon.)

REPLY

Apart from the Forty Hours' Exposition, the prayer of the Blessed Sacrament must be added in Mass:

(a) at an altar where immediately after Mass the Sacred Host is to be exposed, for a public cause and for some time apart from another sacred function;¹

(b) at any Mass, sung or low, celebrated at an altar where Exposition is going on for a public cause and for some time apart from another sacred function.

This prayer is to be added even on the most solemn feasts of the Universal Church (except during Holy Week), and so is not subject to the rule of the simplified rubrics (*D.G.R.S.*,² III, 4a) which excludes commemorations³ on great feasts or in a sung Mass.

The prayer of the Blessed Sacrament follows any imperative commemoration, or a prayer for the Pope or Bishop on their anniversaries (for these are more proper), but precedes a *collecta imperata pro re gravi* and any ordinary commemoration that may occur.

The Blessed Sacrament prayer while not subject to *D.G.R.S.*, III, 4—about the omission of commemorations at certain

¹ Cf. O'Connell, *Celebration of Mass* (1956), p. 164.

² *D.G.R.S.* = the *S.R.C.* decree of 23 March 1955 for the simplification of the rubrics.

³ In any case it is commemorations that are dealt with by this rubric, not occasional prayers.

Masses and on certain occasions—is subject to “the rule of three” (*D.G.R.S.*, III, 3), which, it seems, applies to every class of prayer.¹

The Blessed Sacrament prayer is omitted if the Mass is of an identical mystery (i.e. of the Passion, Cross, Holy Redeemer, Sacred Heart, Most Precious Blood, or the Mass of Jesus Christ High and Eternal Priest), or there is a commemoration of such a mystery.

The differences introduced by the simplification of the rubrics (*D.G.R.S.*) are: (i) that the prayer of the Blessed Sacrament is now prescribed only in a Mass celebrated *at the altar* at which Exposition is in progress, or will begin there immediately after Mass; (ii) it is now said before any ordinary occurring commemoration but after the prayer for the Pope or Bishop; (iii) it is subject to the “rule of three”.

DIOCESAN COMMISSIONS

In n. 118 of the recent Instruction of *S.R.C.* on S. Music and Liturgy there is reference to three diocesan Commissions. Kindly give some information about the origin of these (M. B.)

REPLY

The first of these diocesan Commissions, that on sacred music, was originally ordered by S. Pius X in §24 of the Instruction appended to his famous *Motu Proprio Tra le Sollecitudini* (1903) on the reform of sacred music. “For the exact execution of what has been herein laid down,” wrote S. Pius, “the bishops, if they have not already done so, are to institute in their dioceses a special Commission composed of persons really competent in sacred music, and to this Commission let them entrust in the manner they find most suitable the task of watching over the music executed in their churches.” N. 118 of the new *S.R.C.* Instruction reads “in each diocese a special Commission on sacred music should exist since the time of S. Pius X.

¹ Cf. *THE CLERGY REVIEW*, July 1958, pp. 388, 389.

The members of this Commission, whether priests or laymen, are to be appointed by the local Ordinary, who is to select men who are competent by knowledge and experience in the various branches of sacred music." And in different sections of this Instruction reference is made to this Commission. In doubt about the suitability of a polyphonic composition for use in a liturgical function this Commission is to be consulted (n. 48); and it is to judge whether pieces of modern sacred music have been composed in accordance with liturgical law and the norms for sacred music and so may be allowed for liturgical use (n. 50). The local Ordinary is not to grant leave for a concert of sacred music in a church until he has heard the views of the Commission regarding the programme and the performers (n. 55c); and he is directed to consult the Commission before granting permission for the temporary use of an electronic organ at liturgical functions (n. 64). The Commission is to aid the Ordinary in seeing that the rubrics concerning instrumental music in the Liturgy are observed (n. 69).

The second Commission, that concerning the S. Liturgy, was instituted by Pius XII in 1947, when he wrote in *Mediator Dei* (§116), addressing the bishops about the due conduct of public worship: "To this end we would desire (*nobis in votis est*) that besides a Commission for the regulation of sacred music and art, each diocese should also have a Commission for promoting the liturgical apostolate, so that under your watchful care the instructions of the Apostolic See may in all things be observed." Commenting on this desire of the Pope, Fr Josef Löw, C.S.S.R., Vice-Relator of S.R.C., wrote:¹

The liturgical-legal basis of this liturgical diocesan Commission rests on a twofold foundation. In the first place on the official position of the local Ordinary as the guardian and promoter of the sacred liturgy, as it has been committed to him by the Council of Trent, by the prescriptions of the liturgical books and the decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites and by Canon Law (a right, therefore that is deduced directly from his episcopal office); and now also, in the second place, on the solemnly expressed desire (a mandate in the form of a wish) of the Pope.

¹ *Worship*, September 1955, p. 441.

The origin of the third Commission, that on sacred art, is less clear, it is referred to in *Mediator Dei* (1947, n. 116), in the Instruction on Sacred Art of the Holy Office of 30 June 1952, and again in the Encyclical *Musicae Sacrae* of 1955 (§59), and its official origin seems to be traceable to a circular letter directed from the Secretariate of State to the bishops of Italy by Cardinal Gasparri on 1 September 1924 about a Central Commission for Sacred Art established in Rome, with which diocesan commissions were to co-operate.¹

Because of the close connexion between sacred music, liturgy, and art the recent Instruction repeats the order to set up these three Commissions, and suggests that they work in close consultation and harmony—sometimes meeting in common—and points out the desirability of the Ordinary sometimes presiding over their deliberations (n. 118). The three Commissions are, of course, but the accredited agents of Ordinaries to aid them, as far as possible, in implementing the commands and desires of the Holy See. To cite Fr Löw again:

According to the mind of the Holy Father the episcopal liturgical commissions are as it were the prolonged arms of the Ordinaries themselves, in order to supervise, regulate, promote and bring to its full development the whole field of liturgy, both as worship and as means of salvation.²

J. B. O'C.

EFFECT OF INSINCERITY IN MIXED MARRIAGE GUARANTEES

Mary, a non-Catholic, signed the promises required for a dispensation from the impediment of mixed religion before marrying John, but showed by her subsequent behaviour that she had never any real intention of honouring them. Does this lack of intention affect the validity of the dispensation and thereby of the marriage itself? (G. O'L.)

¹ In a footnote to n. 118 the *S.R.C.* Instruction refers to this letter.

² *Worship*, September 1955, p. 443.

REPLY

Canon 1061, §1: "Ecclesia super impedimento mixtae religionis non dispensat nisi: . . . 2°. Cautionem praestiterit coniux acatholicus de amovendo a coniuge catholico perversionis periculo, et uterque coniux de universa prole catholice tantum baptizanda et educanda;

3°. Moralis habeatur certitudo de cautionum implemento."

Since mixed religion is a merely prohibitive impediment, failure to remove it by a valid dispensation can only affect the lawfulness of the marriage, not its validity. The validity of the present marriage could only be in question if Mary were not in fact baptized, or if John had made sincerity on Mary's part a *conditio sine qua non* of his own matrimonial consent.

As to whether insincerity in the guarantees affects the validity of the dispensation, this is, or rather was until recently, a matter of considerable dispute, with reputable authors ranged in almost equal numbers on either side.¹ Some held that nothing more than moral certainty in the mind of the dispenser could be shown from the legal texts to be required for the validity of the dispensation. Others objected that the Holy Office replies of 13 January 1932 and 10 May 1941 expressly required some form of guarantee, at least implicit, for the validity of the dispensation,² and that an insincere guarantee, externally given but not internally meant, was no form of guarantee at all. Some took the middle line. Cappello, for example, held that if the insincerity was externally expressed in words or writing, whether or not this was known to the dispenser, or if it was apparent enough to him to create positive doubt in his mind, the dispensation was invalid; not, however, if the internal fiction was completely concealed from everyone.³

From the academic point of view, this third position seems

¹ For an excellent survey of the dispute, see Dr Hanrahan's reply in this REVIEW, December 1955, p. 742.

² A.A.S., 1932, XXIV, p. 25; 1941, XXXIII, p. 294.

³ *De Sacramentis*, V (ed. 1950), n. 312; likewise Coronata, *De Sacramentis*, III, n. 354.

to us to be most in keeping with the text of the law, as authentically interpreted hitherto, especially in the *mens* appended to the above-quoted Holy Office reply of 10 May 1941, which declared: "Usus facultatis dispensandi, sive ordinariae sive delegatae, invalidus dici nequit si utraque pars saltem implicite cautiones praestiterit, i.e. eos actus posuerit, e quibus concludendum sit et in foro externo constare possit eam cognoscere obligationem adimplendi conditiones et manifestasse firmum propositum illi obligationi satisfaciendi."¹ This seems to make the validity of the dispensation depend on the external manifestation rather than on the internal existence of sincerity.

No authentic declaration to the contrary has yet been *promulgated* by the Holy Office, which is alone competent to settle the dispute. However, in 1948, a Rotal sentence to the contrary was given with a measure of confidence which indicated that the judges had inside knowledge not available to the generality of canonists.² A marriage contracted with a dispensation from disparity of cult had been impugned before the diocesan tribunal of Albany, N.Y., on the ground that the unbaptized party had not sincerely given the guarantees required for a valid dispensation. Since this raised a disputed point of law, the tribunal sought guidance from the Holy Office and was instructed to proceed with the case and send it on appeal to the Holy Office, which, on receiving it, remitted it directly to the Rota, thereby indicating that it did not recognize any doubt on the point of law. The Rotal sentence, after declaring it "certain" that insincerity in the guarantees invalidates the dispensation, found the claimed insincerity to have been established and pronounced the marriage invalid by reason of the undispensed diriment impediment. The same decision was reached on the same ground in two subsequent Rotal sentences dealing with another case of the same kind,³ and in a Roman Vicariate case,⁴ which was confirmed on appeal by the Holy Office itself.

Fr L. Bender, O.F., a doughty defender of the view that the validity of the dispensation was not affected by internal insin-

¹ Loc. cit.

² *Coram Brennan*, 26 January 1948; cf. *The Jurist*, January 1956, p. 76.

³ *Coram Felici*, 4 April 1951 (*Monitor Ecclesiasticus*, 1951, p. 271); and *coram Brennan*, 26 February 1952 (*Ephemerides Iuris Canonici*, 1952, p. 99).

⁴ *Ephemerides Iuris Canonici*, 1952, p. 107.

cerity on the part of the giver of the guarantees,¹ was unable to reconcile the certainty of the Rotal judges as to the correctness of their interpretation with the almost equally divided opinion of authors, except on the supposition that the Holy Office had authoritatively intervened. Upon enquiry, he tells us,² he was reliably informed that the Holy Office had indeed given to one of the auditors of the Rota the interpretation on which the latter tribunal acted. He therefore withdrew his opinion and retired from the fray, conceding his opponents a victory on points. It would be pedantic to maintain that there is still a positively probable *dubium iuris*. Horse's-mouth information is not, according to the text-books, one of the ways in which disputes among approved authors are authentically settled, and Fr Bender has reason to wonder why the Rotal judges did not mention, in their sentence, the real reason for their certainty, but there would seem to be no denying the fact. If there ever was a *dubium iuris*—and the official attitude appears to be that there never was, it has been settled. A dispensation from the impediment of mixed religion or disparity of cult, granted in response to guarantees that are not sincerely meant by either party, does not remove the impediment. In the former case, therefore, the marriage remains unlawful, and in the latter, invalid.

L. L. McR.

BOOK REVIEWS

Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche; zweite, völlig neu bearbeitete Auflage.

Edited by J. Höfer, Rome, and L. Rahner, Innsbruck. (Vol. i, A—Baronius; vol. ii, Baronius—Cölestiner; Herder, Freiburg, 1957, 1958. Subscription price for each volume, bound in linen 69 DM; in half-leather 77 DM.)

HERDER'S *Lexicon for Theology and Church*, founded by Dr M. Buchberger, now archbishop of Regensburg, became a highly valued

¹ Vlaming-Bender, *Praelectiones Iuris Matrimonii*, ed. 4, pp. 150-3.

² *Monitor Ecclesiasticus*, 1955, p. 320.

and trustworthy dictionary with its second edition, published just before World War II. For many throughout the world it was a primary work of reference for anything connected with the life and theology of the Catholic Church, past and present. Not yet twenty years had elapsed when the first volume of this entirely revised and elaborated edition appeared. Brought up to date with the actual state of research and the data of present-day life of the Church, this revision is almost a new work.

Herder's has already a reputation for good reference books and dictionaries, but the organization behind the revision of this lexicon is phenomenal indeed. The introduction lists fifty-two fields of Catholic learning, each under the directorship of a widely known authority on the subject; some 700 collaborators contributed. Three pages in double columns are taken up by general abbreviations, five by abbreviations of religious Orders and thirty-two others by those of works of reference, text editions, periodicals, handbooks, etc., to be quoted in the bibliographies. In the second volume is an additional page with another thirty-five, and more are certainly to come. All these abbreviations make the articles and the lists of literature as concise as possible. The exceptionally careful and obvious system of cross references, the numerous maps and some well-chosen reproductions make this work unsurpassed.

Since this is "only" a revised edition, the previous number of ten volumes will be maintained. Still, each of them will have some 200 columns more, due to the fact that existing articles are extended and new ones are added.

The revision evidently did not include all entries; in other cases even revision has not always been wholly successful. Among these we should like to mention: *Antiphonar*, *Antonius Orden* (Hospitallers of St Anthony), *Auszug* (Exodus) with its corresponding map, *Aribo Scholasticus*, *Angelusläuten* (Angelus bell), *Ave verum*, *Cisiojanus*, etc., which are still out of date and do not take into account modern research, in either the text or the bibliography. These details show that a lexicon is no more than what it is meant to be: a source book for all who wish to have immediate and useful information. Under the letter A are about fifty, under B twice as many, bibliographical or theological articles directly connected with this country. Even those with a scanty knowledge of German will benefit from using this work; it should have a place on the shelves of any library of standing.

FR S. J. P. VAN DIJK

Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis. By William Graham Cole. Pp. 329. (Allen & Unwin Ltd. 21s.)

Religious Factors in Mental Illness. By Wayne E. Oates. Pp. 239. (Allen & Unwin Ltd. 16s.)

THE Reverend Cole believes in God and in the Resurrection of the Body. He does not believe in the Divinity of Christ and in the immortality of the soul.

Man is a body, he says bluntly, and the idea of a spiritual soul belongs to the Catholics who cribbed it from the Greeks. Moreover, "Jesus was a Jew, speaking and acting out of a heritage of fifteen hundred years. . . . To seek to make any of Jesus' absolutes into laws governing human behaviour is to miss the whole point of his message."

This principle stated, the author clutches Kinsey to his bosom and proceeds to give an exposition of sex and Christianity which is liberal enough to satisfy both an old-time Mormon and a Buddhist. Charity bids us to let the author speak for himself.

1. "The Christian perfectionist always makes the error of assuming that he is confronted with the possibility of fulfilling the command of Jesus without compromise."

2. "If sex and procreation can one day be separated in such a fashion that conception is a completely voluntary occurrence, then it will be difficult to point the accusing finger at any couple who engage in coitus outside the bonds of formal marriage, provided only that the sexual relations represent the creation of 'one flesh', an outward and visible symbol of an inner and invisible union of two selves."

3. "Birth Control is not banned, because there is no strong conviction about the primary purpose of sex."

4. "A wider measure of tolerance for perversion is demanded both by an understanding of the Christian doctrine of sin and by a knowledge of psychodynamics. . . ."

5. "The plumbline of judgement is love, which is genuinely mature and socially responsible, not monogamy as such, which is no more an absolute than a democracy or the free enterprise system."

6. "An activity does not become a perversion until it is used compulsively as a substitute for the standard coital pattern."

7. "All men are anxious, even those who love God and have been psychoanalysed."

With some relief we turned to the good old American Southern Baptist approach of the Reverend Oates to the religious problems of the Mentally Ill.

He writes with sincerity and charity but at no very great depth. He announces that he will make "as little reference as is possible to the sectarian elements of both religion and psychiatry". Nevertheless there creep into the text words like righteousness, communion with fellows, religious experience, community of relationship, and Christian Fellowship. Once he raps Roman Catholic knuckles with a story of a Catholic psychiatrist who asked "a flexible minister" where he refused to bend. On this, answered the minister, "which he learned from Jesus of Nazareth and had seen demonstrated in good psychiatrists: the infinite and primary value of one person as a person and not as a commodity on somebody's institutional market".

After a time it becomes apparent that the Reverend Oates is pitching for Freud. From the Baptist point of view he can tie in Religious Conversion and Religious Experience with abreaction, and Christian Fellowship and Group Religion with social re-education. The result is a shot-gun wedding between Psychoanalysis and the Philadelphia Convention.

We read, with interest, that the occupational hazard of Seminary Professors is "religious blight". "Whereas prisoners in penal institutions get 'stir crazy', the institutional maladjustment of theological professors is to get 'sour on the world'."

ALAN KEENAN, O.F.M.

A History of Philosophy. Vol. 4. *Descartes to Leibniz*. By Frederick Copleston, s.j. Pp. xi + 370. (Burns Oates. 30s.)

THE prefatory notice which Fr Copleston has contributed to this volume enables us to see the final plan of his *History of Philosophy*, even though two further volumes remain to be published. Students are familiar with the design of the earlier volumes: in Volume 1 the author had dealt with the philosophy of Greece and Rome; Volume 2 had considered three periods of "christian" philosophy, Patristic, early Mediaeval, and the "period of metaphysical thinking on the grand scale"; and in Volume 3 he had studied the development of the *via moderna*, associated with William of Ockham, together with the ferment of individualistic philosophies of the Renaissance and the attempts of the Spanish scholastics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to bring about a revival of Scholasticism. That volume had concluded with a short review of the first three volumes, and it ended with the remark that the next volume in the series would treat of "modern" philosophy from Descartes to Kant inclusive. In the event, Fr Copleston has found it necessary to devote three separate volumes to the modern period, so that Volume 4, now published, is restricted to the "Continental" systems of rationalism

in the pre-Kantian period, while Volume 5 is to consider the development of British philosophy from the time of Hobbes to the Scottish philosophers of common sense, and Volume 6 will deal with the French and German Enlightenment and the system of Kant.

The student is provided with a general perspective of the period as a whole, through a lengthy introductory chapter which affords a descriptive picture of the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to which these three volumes will be devoted, and Fr Copleston anticipates the later volumes by giving an excellent summary of British empiricism and a masterly outline of the theories of Continental thinkers leading up to the crisis in philosophy with the attempts of Kant to provide a harmony between the requirements of science and of morality. In the volume now under review, he is principally concerned with the rationalist philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, and he shows how, captivated by the successes of mathematical reasoning, they sought to use an analogous method of deduction from *a priori* principles, in order to construct a metaphysical and moral philosophy that would be immune from the assaults of the sceptics and the free-thinkers of the day. The author then goes on to treat in detail of the work of those three outstanding philosophers, displaying the objectivity of judgement and clarity of exposition which has won the admiration of philosophers far removed from scholastic circles; and he also takes the opportunity to insert chapters on the thought of Pascal and of Malebranche.

The careful and detailed bibliographies, though not intended to be exhaustive, were important features of the previous volumes. They are continued in the present volume and in themselves they represent a notable achievement, even though they follow an alphabetical order, instead of the chronological order which some would prefer. The list of general studies, covering the whole period in question, is of particular value. In this connexion we may recall that, from the start, the *History* has been written, not for scholars or specialists, but for ecclesiastical students, who would be making their first acquaintance with the history of philosophy, while devoting most of their time to systematic scholastic philosophy. Considering these readers, then, whom the author has principally in view, one notes with pleasure how he has drawn attention to the Everyman Series of texts, and to the excellent studies that have appeared in the Pelican Philosophy Series published by Penguin Books. In both of those series, the modest format and the assurance of enormous sales have made it possible for important works to be readily available at prices well within the reach of the average seminarian. The same cannot, unfortunately, be said of Fr Copleston's own work. When the

revised edition of the first volume appeared, in 1947, we were offered 521 pages for eighteen shillings; the latest volume has 370 pages and costs thirty shillings—and in fact that price is now demanded for all the published volumes and, it seems, for the volumes still to appear. This means, therefore, that the student beginning his seminary course will have to find nine pounds if he is to provide himself with a work which he will have been told, rightly, to regard as indispensable; indeed, even more will have to be found, if Fr Copleston can be persuaded to extend his *History* beyond the philosophy of Kant and down to our own times.

J. MOLLOY

Saint Paul: Épître aux Romains. By Joseph Huby, s.j. New edition by Stanislas Lyonnet, s.j. Pp. viii + 643. (Coll. *Verbum Salutis*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1957. Paper covers, no price.)

L'Histoire des Apôtres. By Gilbert Le Mouél. Pp. 197. (Editions Ouvrières, Paris, 1957. 500 francs.)

The Acts of the Apostles. By C. C. Martindale, s.j. Pp. xxxv + 199. (Stonyhurst Scripture Manuals, Longmans, 1958. 10s.)

Saint Paul. By Daniel-Rops. Translated by Jex Martin. Pp. 150. (Clonmore & Reynolds and Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1957. 12s. 6d.)

OF popular works on St Paul may there never be an end. Each succeeding generation will need to have brought to its notice, in a manner it can appreciate, something of the story and the thought of this amazing man, whose figure dominates well over half of the New Testament, and who was, in God's Providence, more than anyone else responsible for giving to the Gospel its definition and clarification. Each generation will need to discover for itself the extraordinary relevance of his message, and to be fired again by the enthusiasm of one whose vision of Christianity swept the world of the first century off its feet.

The epistle to the Romans is St Paul's masterpiece. By the year A.D. 57 the controversies which had sparked off his turbulent letters to Thessalonica, Corinth and Galatia were over, and for the first time in his stormy life he was able to sit down and make a full and systematic statement of what the Gospel meant to him: the one message of salvation for all who are willing to commit themselves to the love God has shown us in Christ. The epistles written five years later from his Roman captivity were to make this statement even more complete, but Romans remains the keystone of St Paul's theology, a fact recognized by the Fathers and by theologians of all

ages, not least by the Reformers. The late Fr Huby's little commentary on the epistle was first published in 1939. The edition sold out almost immediately, as indeed have the numerous editions of the fifteen other volumes in this excellent series of pocket commentaries on the New Testament. The new edition appears, appropriately enough as a red label on the cover announces, in this year of the nineteenth anniversary of the epistle's first publication. In respect to Fr Huby, his disciple Fr Lyonnet has not made any changes in the text of the first edition's simple, popular yet profound exposition of the epistle, but has inserted a number of references to his own additional notes at the end of the book, with which Fr Huby's work has been completed and brought up to date. The particularly difficult text of v, 12-14, on original sin, has been given a very full appendix of its own, and a subject-index added to help the reader find his way around this rich epistle.

St Paul's epistles are only given their full dimension and meaning when they are seen in the context in which they were written. They are never mere abstract treatises of theology, but always (and this applies even to the systematic epistle to the Romans) the response to particular needs and circumstances. Their full understanding depends very largely, therefore, on a study of the Acts of the Apostles, whose narrative forms their living background. The commentaries here offered by Le Mouël and Martindale have both been made for popular consumption, the latter forming part of a series of school text-books, and the former being one of a number of short studies which are being prepared for the French Y.C.W. The approach of the two authors is inevitably different. Both preface their work with the introductory questions necessary to the understanding of the Acts (author, plan, purpose, chronology, doctrine), and both present the full text (the Douay in Martindale and a new translation made especially for this edition in Le Mouël), to which footnotes have been added throughout by way of explanation. But that is about as far as the two run parallel. In its explanations the English commentary, without underplaying the doctrinal aspect, concentrates almost entirely on the kind of technical information which makes of Acts primarily a history of the first century A.D. The French, without obscuring its value for illustrating the life of St Paul, is far more concerned to show the book as an outline of the shape to which the Church must conform through all time. Both approaches are legitimate, and the first is perhaps necessary if the requirements of the religious examiner are to be met. One may be allowed to suggest that the second is more fruitful.

For those who prefer to take their Pauline studies in predigested

form, the latest work of Daniel-Rops can be eagerly recommended. Not that it is to be thought of as a substitute for reading the New Testament itself: no *Life of St Paul* will have achieved its purpose if it does not encourage the reader to approach the Apostle's own writings in order to share something of his radiant love for Christ. But no one is more fitted to give such encouragement than Daniel-Rops, whose works on Scripture have earned a deserved popularity for their movement, colour and life. St Paul, his background, his dynamic career, his winning personality and his imperishable message, are here presented with force, insight and dignity. The translation into English by Mr Martin is accurate, lucid and a joy to read. What a pity that his knowledge of Greek does not match his command of French and English, and that he did not have his work checked by someone who could have told him that St Paul's turbulent sentences are not "awkwardly joined by *et* and *car*" but quite simply by *and* and *for* (p. 106).

H. J. R.

The Latter Prophets. By T. Henshaw. (George Allen & Unwin. 30s.)

THIS book comes under the heading of *Introduction*; and those familiar with this type of literature may be prepared for something rather formidable. And certainly it is more marked for information than for inspiration; but the information that is given is relevant, useful, up to date and reliable, and it is given clearly and concisely.

The first few chapters constitute what might be called a general introduction, dealing with the prophets, the literature, and the historical background; only in this last could it be complained that there is some overlapping, since the author deals first with the history and then with the archaeology—whereas, of course, most of our knowledge of the history comes precisely from the archaeology. Then he deals with each of the prophets individually, in their presumed chronological order, under such headings as the life, times and character of the prophet, the state of the text, a surprisingly complete analysis of the book, and finally a note on its permanent influence. We are given all that is necessary for an intelligent appreciation of the prophets—there is even a collection of appendices dealing briefly with matters which cannot be said to concern the prophets essentially, but which are useful accompaniment to their reading: priesthood, sacrifice, even weights and measures and a chronological table.

The author has deliberately limited his scope to the practical end he has in view; there are no footnotes, and the bibliography is restricted largely to the main English works on the subject. Never-

theless the reader cannot fail to be aware of the author's competence and familiarity with the best modern works on the subject. In fact, his views are almost a model of academic orthodoxy—Daniel is, quite rightly, omitted since it is not a prophetic work in the same sense as the others; Isaiah is dealt with after Micah, but Isaiah 40–55 is put in the exile period, and the rest of Isaiah is post exilic; Zechariah similarly is dealt with in three quite distinct books; the relationship of prophecy to priesthood is given according to the most fashionable opinion of the day—that so far from being opposed, as a previous generation held, they were often associated in official service of the cult. Of course, such orthodoxy is to be desired in such a book—it is preferable to have the best modern view, or a choice of views, than the individual idiosyncrasies of one author. Moreover, it is to be expected that the best academic orthodoxy will not normally conflict with religious orthodoxy; though we do read that the book of Jonah “contains a miraculous element which constitutes an insuperable obstacle to a belief in its historicity”. However, even here the author goes on to explain and substantiate his opinion in a way that most Catholics would agree with.

This is not an exciting book, nor even light reading; but there is probably not in English any better introduction or companion to the reading of the prophets.

The Apocalypse of St John. By H. M. Féret, O.P. Translated by Elizabette Corathiel. (Blackfriars Publications. 21s.)

THE *Apocalypse* is not a cryptic commentary on either contemporary or future history, but is firmly rooted in the circumstances of the time when it was written. Fr Féret begins, therefore, with a chapter on the contemporary situation—the literary conventions of apocalyptic style to which the author is tributary, and the historical situation which prompted him to write. It was the time of Domitian, when the claims of emperor worship were imposed on the Roman world. As Féret shows in his second chapter, this was a much greater danger to the young Church than the syncretist religion which had occasioned this move, because it was so directly contrary to the idea of the kingship of God, His universal dominion even over the civil power. The kingship of Christ is opposed by the divinity of the emperor; and the *Apocalypse* is written mainly to give Christians confidence in the outcome of the unequal struggle.

But the book does go on to deal with the development of the world's history, but from the point of view of the religious principles involved: “there is a far deeper purpose to the book than the mere satisfaction of speculative imaginings or vain curiosity”. So the

author deals in his next five chapters with the great religious truths which the *Apocalypse* sees at work in history. These chapters, like the first two, are in the form of general essays, though they do follow more or less the order in which the various ideas appear in the *Apocalypse*. It is not, then, a verse-by-verse commentary, but on the other hand it is not merely a series of essays round about the book. It is meant to be read with the text, and certainly profits from such reading; and two appendices give a plan and a translation of the text.

This is a sound, useful and illuminating explanation of the *Apocalypse*, not only explaining the text, avoiding any temptation to see in it a cross-word clue to the hidden future, but bringing out clearly the religious truths which should guide our thoughts at any moment of history. There is only one point about which the reader may remain somewhat sceptical. As the author himself shows, it is not always easy to distinguish the essential teaching from the "literary wrapping" in which it is conveyed; and particularly as we approach the end of the book it is not always easy to allot each incident its exact place in the historical scheme of things. But the author himself seems inclined, if we read him correctly, to a definite form of "millenarism"—some long period of success on this earth before the final end and the final judgement. Even on his own analysis, apart from other considerations, this interpretation does not seem to be very convincing.

The book is the result of lectures delivered in Paris; it may be said that this origin has left very little trace in the style—on the contrary, it is, if anything, rather torpid. The translation is in general adequate, but attention must be drawn to the footnotes; there are not many of these—Allo is explicitly the authority followed throughout—and it is not serious that the normal conventions of reference are ignored, but it is surprising to find so many minor slips of spelling (Sertillanges, for instance, is credited with a book entitled *La Vie Francais*), omission of accents, and that most irritating trick, an English title for a work with a French publisher (here called *Blond and Gay*).

L. JOHNSTON

St Benedict, Hero of the Hills. By Mary Fabyan Windeatt. Pp. 190. (*Vision Books.* Burns Oates. 12s. 6d.)

WHEN the boy Benedict left the city of Rome and went off to the hills, he did so to find peace—and found it. "Pax" has been the Benedictine motto ever since, and all who know St Benedict's sons and daughters will agree that it suits them admirably. The daughters

are the spiritual descendants of St Scholastica, Benedict's charming sister, who has an important place in his life-story. It is a long distance from Italian Subiaco (one of the most remote places in the world) and Monte Cassino to English Canterbury, but these famous names are closely linked in Benedictine history, as this book describes it. To have begun an Order, now world-wide in membership, by the time he was twenty years of age, says much for the greatness of this saint, who was on every consideration one of God's heroes. Catholic children profit much by this type of book; it nurtures an appreciation of their heritage, and a loving familiarity with those who, like St Benedict, bequeathed to them the treasure of the Faith.

The Curé of Ars. By Milton Lomask. Pp. 190. (*Vision Books.* Burns Oates. 12s. 6d.)

ANOTHER book about the holy priest who "outtalked the Devil" is further evidence of increasing devotion to the saint who is universally known as the Curé of Ars. The story of his life is here told for children, boys in particular, and especially those of them who feel called to the priesthood but shrink from doing much about it because they find studies so difficult. Let them read how the "fool of the family", Jean-Marie Vianney, who was considered hopelessly backward, plodded on until he knelt for the Lord's anointing, and then became one of the most useful and most famous priests of the nineteenth century. Ars is the village he completely converted from carelessness and sin to deep Catholic piety. Part of the price he paid for his success was diabolical attack from evil spirits. The reader is told about this, about the Curé's faith in St Philomena, and indeed about everything of importance in his wonderful life. He is honoured everywhere by God's priests; this book will help to make him a favourite with young readers, and notably with boys preparing for the priesthood.

St Helena and the True Cross. By Louis de Wohl. Pp. 190. (*Vision Books.* Burns Oates. 12s. 6d.)

THE finding of the True Cross makes a thrilling story, read all the more eagerly by English children because the heroine, St Helena, was a British princess. She is among that company of wonderful mothers who are the glory of the Church, her special task being to develop nobility of soul in a promising son, Constantine, who became the first Christian Emperor of Rome. Helena's perilous journey to the Holy Land, and her search for the most prized relic on earth, the Cross upon which Christ died, ended very happily—as

is expected of children's stories—with the discovery of the sought-for treasure. Perhaps Mr de Wohl's dialogue is sometimes too American to please every reader. When at the end of a harangue Constantine says: "Let's go," one almost waits for someone to add: "Ten four," but the book is none the worse for that. It is an old story told in a new style.

A Father Faber Heritage. By Sister Mary Mercedes, S.N.D. Pp. 368. (Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland. \$4.75.)

IF to say of a man (quoting from the Book of Wisdom) that "with him early achievement counted for long apprenticeship" is to claim for him a place among the great servants of God, then Fr Faber is unquestionably one of a glorious company. He died at the early age of forty-nine, having spent his last sixteen years in the Catholic priesthood as a most zealous apostle of the truth, his many talents completely dedicated to the care of souls. Since his active life was so largely devoted to the ephemeral everyday work of a parish priest, it is unmarked by any great monument; but the quiet hours spent in his study will be lastingly remembered because of the spiritual books that resulted from his hidden labours. It is from these books that *A Father Faber Heritage* is compiled.

Sister Mary Mercedes has exercised great care in making her selection. Having studied thousands of Faber's pages, she gives her readers fewer than four hundred, the cream of the author's written work during the last ten years of his life. Here are extracts from such well-known books as *All for Jesus*, *Growth in Holiness*, *The Precious Blood*, *Bethlehem*, *The Blessed Sacrament*. In reading Faber's colourful prose one realizes why the Catholics of the author's own day turned so eagerly to his written works, and why it was that translations appeared in so many foreign languages. He is at the same time thoroughly sound theologically, and deeply spiritual. Ascetical writers frequently remind us that spiritual reading has the same effect in the soul as meditation: the assertion is strikingly borne out by the works of the great Oratorian.

L. T. H.

PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

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